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INTRODUCTION 
Souls are mixed with things; things with souls. Lives are 
mingled together, and this is how, among persons and things 
so intermingled, each emerges from their own sphere and 
mixes together. This is precisely what contract and 
2 exchange are. 
167 
Are souls mixed with things, as anthropologist Marcel 
Mauss argued in his eminent The Gift book, or are our 
commodified lives neatly separated from our affective lives? 
When it comes to law, does our legal system validate and 
protect affectively motivated promises?3 For example, does our 
law support a father's explicit and intentional promise to his 
son to give him valuable bonds?4 The conventional legal 
response is a definite negative answer: American contract law 
has been described as having an "apparent prejudice against 
gratuitous transfers,,,5 regardless of "how well-evidenced the 
promise is and no matter how serious the promisor was.,,6 
From here we can go on to the normative question of should 
promises of this kind be enforceable? And indeed, legal 
scholars have never stopped debating the enforceability 
2 MARCEL MAuss, THE GIFT 20 (W. D. Halls trans., W. W. Norton & Co. 2000) 
(1950). 
3 In this article, I use the term "affective" interchangeably with "emotional." 
This draws on the defmition of "affective" as "relating to, arising from, or influencing 
feelings or emotions." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 21 (11th ed. 
2004), available at http://www.merriam-webster.comldictionary/affective.This is not, 
of course, the only way one could define "affect." See, e.g., KEITH OATLEY, DACHER 
KELTNER & JENNIFER M. JENKINS, UNDERSTANDING EMOTIONS 29 (2d ed. 2006) 
(defming "affective" as comprehending a larger domain including emotions, moods and 
dispositions). 
4 These were the basic facts ofthe case of Young v. Young, 80 N.Y. 422 (1880). 
5 Joseph Siprut, The Peppercorn Reconsidered: Why a Promise To Sell 
Blackacre for Nominal Consideration Is Not Binding, but Should Be, 97 Nw. U.L. REV. 
1809, 1835 (2003). 
6 Melvin A. Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 CAL. L. 
REV. 821, 822 (1997); see also Roy KREITNER, CALCULATING PROMISES 56-67 (2007) 
(discussing the refusal to enforce donative promises and citing Beaver v. Beaver, 22 
N.E. 940, 941-42 (N.Y. 1889), in which the court held: "The intention to give is often 
established by most satisfactory evidence, although the gift fails. Instruments may be 
even so formally executed by the donor . . . or there may be the most explicit 
declaration of an intention to give ... yet, unless there is delivery, the intention is 
defeated."). In the classic case of Dougherty v. Salt, for example, Judge Cardozo held 
that an aunt's promise to pay her nephew $3,000 was unenforceable even though she 
had filled out and signed a printed form of promissory note for that amount and 
handed it to him. See Dougherty v. Salt, 125 N.E. 94 (N.Y. 1919). 
3
Keren: Considering Affective Consideration
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2010
168 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
question. Most of them end up explaining and justifying the 
mystery of the current refusal to legally acknowledge promises 
to give gifts. The automatic refusal to enforce such promises 
has an enigmatic aura because other Western legal systems do 
not hesitate to enforce similar promises, and even Anglo-
American law enforced them in the past. What happened, 
then, and why is it that we feel unsure about the appropriate 
legal meaning of promises to give gifts? 
In the intense debate over this question,7 Professor Melvin 
Eisenberg suggests one leading explanation.s To him, we hold 
to an unenforceability rule (and should continue it) because 
promises to give gifts are fundamentally different from other 
contractual promises. In fact, Eisenberg goes as far as to 
suggest that common contractual promises and promises to 
give gifts belong to two different worlds that are not fused and 
should not be mixed. He argues that "[a]ffective values like 
love, friendship, affection, gratitude and comradeship," rather 
than common self-interested incentives, typify the world of gift 
and the altruistic promises that are made in the intimate 
sphere.9 The affective roots of those promises stand at the core 
of their unenforceability and have led Eisenberg and others to 
define them as a special kind of gratuitous promises entitled 
"donative promises."l0 
7 While modern Anglo-American law is famous for denying the enforceability of 
promises to gift, scholars have never stopped searching for explanations for this rule. 
Their continuing questions have produced a scholarly counterpoint that is almost as 
old as the rule itself. Professor Eisenberg refers to this growing body of literature that 
calls for enforcement as the "third wave" of gift scholarship. He cites fourteen articles 
that directly discussed the issue between 1988 and 1997. See Eisenberg, supra note 6, 
at 831 & n.34. The debate has intensified in recent years, as several newer arguments 
have sought to defend the rule and even more frequently to contest it. See, e.g., Robert 
A. Prentice, "Law &" Gratuitous Promises, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 881 (2007) (a critical 
analysis from the perspective of Behavioral Law and Economics). 
8 Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 831. 
9 Id. at 849. 
10 Since the goal here is to directly address the kinds of promises that present 
the most serious challenge to enforceability, and to deal with the most forceful 
contemporary arguments against enforceability, this Article refrains from analyzing 
gratuitous promises made in the business setting, or charitable contributions made for 
self-commemoration. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(2) (1981), which 
recommends a rule of enforcement of charitable subscriptions. Instead, this Article will 
focus on gratuitous promises that are motivated by emotion and are made in relatively 
intimate settings. Therefore, if there is sufficient ground to enforce these highly 
affective promises, then justifying the enforcement of all less-affective gratuitous 
promises should become a straightforward move. 
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While adopting Eisenberg's descriptive explanation, this 
Article looks critically at the normative argument that follows 
it in order to justifY a rule of unenforceability. Although 
donative promises are based on emotions and are 
fundamentally different from common market promises, it still 
does not necessarily follow that only the latter promises should 
be legally binding. This Article challenges the inherent conflict 
between law and emotions by utilizing the new perspective of 
law and the emotions to reevaluate the contemporary 
arguments against enforceability.l1 One of this Article's central 
11 Legal actors have traditionally assumed that emotions, believed to be 
irrational, devoid of thought, and potentially dangerous, should remain outside the 
legal sphere. See, e.g., Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral 
Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 438 (2005) ("Historically, emotions were thought to be 
states of the mind that caused one to deviate from purely rational calculation .... "). 
This view is starting to change, and an increasing number of legal scholars have 
begun to explore the role of emotions in the law and the impact law has over the 
emotions. While most of this work has focused on the criminal law, some works 
have explored the role of certain emotions in non-criminal contexts such as 
alternative dispute resolution and administrative, securities, tort, employment, 
and constitutional law. 
For works in the criminal area, see, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME, 
AND REINTEGRATION (1989); Susan Bandes, Fear Factor: The Role of Media 
in Covering and Shaping the Death Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 585 
(2004); Theodore Eisenberg et aI., But Was He Sorry? The Role of Remorse in 
Capital Sentencing, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1599 (1998); Dan M. Kahan, The 
Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1621 (1998); Samuel 
H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal 
Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655, 655 (1989) (discussing emotions and 
criminal sentencing). For works out of the criminal area, see, e.g., ROGER 
FISHER & DANIEL SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASON: USING EMOTIONS AS YOu 
NEGOTIATE (2005); Neal R. Feigenson, Merciful Damages: Some Remarks on 
Forgiveness, Mercy and Tort Law, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1633 (2000); Neal 
R. Feigenson, Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A Psychological Analysis, 65 
TENN. L. REV. 1 (1997); Catherine L. Fisk, Humiliation at Work, 8 WM. & 
MARy J. WOMEN & L. 73 (2001); Peter H. Huang, International 
Environmental Law and Emotional Rational Choice, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 237 
(2002); Peter H. Huang, Reasons Within Passions: Emotions and Intentions 
in Property Rights Bargaining, 79 OR. L. REV. 435 (2000); Peter H. Huang, 
Trust, Guilt, and Securities Regulation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1059 (2003); Owen 
D. Jones, Law, Emotions, and Behavioral Biology, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 283 
(1999); Erin Ryan, The Discourse Beneath: Emotional Epistemology in Legal 
Deliberation and Negotiation, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 231 (2005); Cass R. 
Sunstein et aI., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and 
Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2095-100 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61 
(2002); R. George Wright, An Emotion-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 
34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 429 (2003). 
This diverse body of work has been described as an emerging field of 
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goals is to inform the lingering scholarly debate with some 
essential non-legal knowledge about the relevant concrete 
emotions that playa role in the "world of gift." With no effort 
made to learn about affective dynamics in gift situations, the 
unenforceability rule seems grounded only in a general belief 
that the law should avoid affectively laden problems.12 The 
need to further justify an unenforceability rule or to revise it 
arises from the fact that adhering to the rule is not cost-free. 13 
Similar to market promises, both the initial will of the 
promisor and the initial expectation of the promisee are at 
stake here. The legal system has to carefully consider a denial 
of legal protection for both parties, especially if such denial 
may denote that keeping such promises is less significant. 
Since the idea of changing the unenforceability rule may 
seem drastic, a few words about the scope of the discussion are 
in order. The focal point of this Article is the freedom to 
contract: the freedom of making legally binding donative 
promises and enabling reliance on them. This Article is not 
considering legal intervention with people's relationships or 
emotions when their wish is to stay away from the law and 
make promises that would be subject only to moral and social 
norms. Both in the business arena and outside of it, people 
scholarship called "law and emotions." See, e.g., Terry A. Maroney, Law 
and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, 30 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 119, 119-20 (2006) ("'Law and emotion' ... might now be 
added to a family of interdisciplinary approaches that includes . . . law 
and economics and feminist jurisprudence."). 
12 In this respect, it is worth noting that harmonious intimacy may characterize 
the birth of a donative promise, and the generous promisor usually does not breach the 
promise. Instead, the promisor's heirs initiate the breach, as they tend to care more 
about their financial self-interests and far less about the wishes of the promisor or the 
valid expectations of the promisee. In other words, by the time the law has to speak, 
many of the original emotions are gone and the breach that calls for legal response is 
no longer that different from any other breach. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 
822-23; E. Allan Farnsworth, Promises To Make Gifts, 43 AM. J. COMPo L., 359, 363 
(1995); MARVIN A. CmRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF 
CONTRACT 20-21 (2006); ROY KREITNER, CALCULATING PROMISES 45 (2007) ("Litigation 
over the validity of gifts arises almost exclusively after the donor has died."). 
13 Note that this argument presupposes that enforceability has a distinct value. 
Legal enforceability is taken here as supporting the non-legal human behavior of 
promising by an external mechanism supplied by society. This process has value 
beyond the increase of the practical probability that the promise will be kept. It also 
reflects society's belief in the importance, morality and value of the supported promise. 
All this is currently withheld from donative promises, a point that will be further 
developed throughout the third Part ofthis Article. 
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should enjoy the recently acknowledged freedom iTom 
contract. I4 The only question raised here is whether both 
spheres allow people to enjoy similar levels of freedom to create 
a contract, if they so wish. I5 This last question goes back to 
Williston's days,I6 and it has not been answered. But it has 
been repeated by such contemporary legal actors as Judge 
Richard Posner:I7 if a promisor wishes to make a legally 
binding promise to give a gift, why shouldn't the law support 
her? 
The question whether to enforce donative promises is 
theoretically meaningful and pragmatically significant. On the 
theoretical level, it is connected to the larger question of the 
boundaries of contract law: which promises should be enforced 
and which should not? Is it up to the parties to decide whether 
contract law will be applied to their relationship, or is it up to 
the legal system to decide, as matter of public policy, whether 
parties are allowed to create legally binding promises? More 
pragmatically, the question is a pressing one. Despite the long 
reign of the unenforceability rule and several legal 
alternatives/8 people continue to engage in making donative 
14 The symposium titled "Freedom from Contract" took place at the University of 
Wisconsin Law School on February 7, 2004, and the papers were later published in a 
symposium issue (2004 WIS. L. REV.). For a discussion of freedom of contract as 
consisting of at least three different freedoms - the freedom in, from and to contract -
see Hila Keren, We Insist! Freedom Now: Does Contract Doctrine Have Anything 
Constitutional To Say? 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 133, 168-79 (2005). 
15 This Article challenges the traditional belief that the difference between 
commercial promises and donative promises requires contrasting legal regimes. It will 
be later argued that in those respects that should matter to contemporary contract law, 
the two kinds of promises share sufficient structural similarities to merit comparable 
treatment. However, it does not deny the affective background or the special, valuable 
character of donative promises. To the contrary: it insists on developing a nuanced 
understanding of the distinctiveness of gift promising, in order to better evaluate the 
question of its enforcement. 
18 Melvin Eisenberg, The Principles of Consideration, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 640, 
659 (1982) (citing Williston, who wrote, "[AJ person ought to be able ... if he wishes to 
do it ... to create a legal obligation to make a gift. Why not? ... I don't see why a man 
should not be able to make hinIselfliable if he wishes to do so."). 
17 Richard Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 
411 (1977). 
18 The main alternatives are trusts and wills, which are much less intuitive, far 
more costly, cannot be created without professional help, require coping with 
formalities, and are highly tinIe-consuming. All of these factors render trusts and wills 
far less attractive devices for making promises to give gifts. See James Gordley, 
Enforcing Promises, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 547, 570-71 (1995) ("By a trust, one can give 
away any type of property by declaring that one holds it in trust for the donee. The 
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promises in a contractual manner, which seems to presuppose 
the assistance of contract law. 19 The gap between such 
promising patterns, on the one hand, and the refusal of the 
legal system to enforce the promises, on the other, gives the 
ongoing scholarly debate a practical edge and further justifies 
efforts to resolve the problem of enforceability - a task that this 
Article seeks to accomplish. 
Focusing on the interaction of law and emotions, this 
Article unfolds in three parts.20 Part I illuminates the 
connection between the affective background of donative 
promises and their modem unenforceability. It hypothesizes 
that rejecting promises that are not supported by consideration 
can be seen as an effort to distance law from any association 
with irrational decisionmaking and to disassociate it from 
"emotional" spheres. 
Part II seeks to correct the erroneous way affective giving 
has been perceived by law in the gifts context. The law must 
carefully analyze each relevant emotion concretely and 
separately, rather than treating emotion as an undifferentiated 
aggregate. This part is dedicated to an interdisciplinary 
investigation of the leading emotions that play a role in the 
context of gifts and altruistic behavior: empathy and gratitude. 
Part III integrates the knowledge gained in Part II with 
the normative question of the desirable rule for donative 
promises. It suggests that given the special function of 
empathy and gratitude in the gift setting, the main 
justifications for the enforcement of bargained-for promises 
support the enforcement of donative promises. Part III 
concludes with the suggestion that enforcement should not be 
dependent on the motives that led to promising and instead 
trust is then irrevocable if the donor so declares, and the intention to create an 
irrevocable trust will usually be found even without such a declaration."). 
19 See, e.g., Levine v. Estate of Barton (In re Barton), No. W2004-02913-COA-R3-
CV, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2005). 
20 Those parts correspond to three dimensions of law-and-the-emotions 
scholarship as they have been recently defined. See Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, 
Mos Afraid of Law and the Emotions 94 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (arguing 
that the above three dimensions can be marked by three alliterative terms: 
illumination, Investigation and Integration. "Illumination" stands for the task of 
clarifying the often unacknowledged but significant role played by emotions in a 
particular legal setting, "Investigation" stands for the interdisciplinary effort to better 
understand the specific emotions at hand, and "Integration" stands for the normative 
challenge of going back to law and reformulating it based on the new emotion-oriented 
insights). 
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would depend on the intention of promisors to be legally bound 
by their promises. It is suggested that the freedom to make 
legally binding promises would be afforded to players in all 
spheres of life and less biased toward profit-seeking activities. 
The Article ends with a concrete suggestion to move from total 
refusal to enforce donative promises to a cautious willingness 
to enforce them "consciously": only in cases of provable 
intention to create legally binding promises. 
1. ILLUMINATING THE PLACE OF EMOTIONS IN THE 
ENFORCEMENT DEBATE 
The unenforceability of donative promises is often 
explained by the fact that such promises typically emerge in 
the intimate sphere and are motivated by strong affective 
connection between the promisor and the promisee. 21 In 
contrast to transactions made at the core of the market at 
arm's length, they are not aimed at maximizing the revenues of 
the parties and the contractual connection between the parties 
does not start the relationship, but is the result of the 
relationship's existence. Furthermore, counter to short-term 
market promises, the relationship usually lasts long after the 
promise has been made.22 
Despite those apparent dissimilarities, there is nothing 
inherent in donative promises to render them unenforceable. 
In many ways they are not that different from market 
promises: their monetary value, their importance to the lives of 
the parties, and their clear articulation are often comparable to 
those of more common promises. Moreover, the common law 
itself enforced donative promises in the past. Primarily, these 
were subject to satisfying formal requirements such as the use 
21 Eisenberg, supra note 6. For an explanation of the decision to focus on 
promises with such background, see note 10, supra. 
22 The above-mentioned case of Levine can demonstrate those main features of a 
donative promise. Levine, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 825, at *20. In this case, the 
promise was made (in writing) by a lover to his beloved one in the course of an intimate 
relationship that lasted twenty-three years, until the death of the promisor. [d. at *2. 
Mr. Barton promised Ms. Levine ongoing fmancial support, emphasizing his long-term 
intentions. [d. He wrote, "rm not talking about the short term but the long term, until 
to (sic) are settled comfortably fmancially. (However long that takes.)." [d. However, 
upon his death his heirs refused to keep the promise, and Ms. Levine had to sue. [d. at 
*4. She failed, as donative promises are not enforceable. [d. at *14-*18. 
9
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of a seal,23 and sometimes by appearing to accept feelings like 
love as consideration that justified enforcement.24 
Comparatively, donative promises have enjoyed many years of 
enforceability under other Western legal systems without 
presenting any special problems.25 
The fact that enforceability could have been a valid 
possibility for donative promises makes the modern Anglo-
American unenforceability rule a matter of choice, or 
preference, to disassociate them from the law of contracts. The 
decision to separate donative promises and deny them 
enforcement, therefore, calls for a more careful examination: 
one that focuses on law's complex relationship with the 
emotions. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE UNENFORCEABILITY OF 
DONATIVE PROMISES 
Despite periods of enforcement, an increasing reluctance to 
enforce promises to gift developed throughout the second half 
of the nineteenth century in a process that can best be 
understood by contextualization. It is deeply intertwined with 
other legal developments of the era that have produced what is 
known as the classical doctrine of contract law. Contemporary 
scholarship has already illuminated an essential part of the 
context by pointing to the reformation of the consideration 
doctrine during this period of time. In his 2001 article entitled 
The Gift Beyond the Grave/6 Professor Kreitner convincingly 
explains how classical contract-law theorists had intentionally 
isolated donative promises and classified them as non-
enforceable in an effort to create a new focal point for contract 
law around the question of "which promises the law should 
23 Joseph Siprut, supra note 5, at 1811-15 (tracing the history of the seal and of 
comparable formalities and demonstrating that in the past such formalities were used 
to make gratuitous promises binding). 
2. See Mark K. Moller, Sympathy, Community, and Promising: Adam Smith's 
Case for Reviving Moral Consideration, 66 U. Cm. L. REV. 213, 214 (1999) (describing 
how "courts held that a donative promise, absent any bargain or promise in exchange, 
became enforceable in 'affective' relationships"). 
25 JOHN P. DAWSON, GIFTS AND PROMISES: CONTINENTAL AND AMERICAN LAW 
COMPARED (1980). 
26 Roy Kreitner, The Gift Beyond the Grave: Revisiting the Question of 
Consideration, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1876 (2001). 
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enforce.,,27 In his words: 
Classical theorists revolutionized consideration and contract 
generally, primarily by redefining it as the legal category 
dealing with enforceable promises. Part of this redefinition 
and categorization entailed burying the gift.28 
Kreitner's article offers an elaborated historical description 
of the deep "cleansing,,29 work that was needed to accomplish 
the goal of reshaping the consideration doctrine and to portray 
contract law as the law that enforces free choices.30 The new 
and purified version of the consideration doctrine had the role 
of a gate keeper - letting into contract law the valuable 
bargained-for promises while leaving other matters out.31 As 
part of this process, contract-law theorists had deliberately 
made gratuitous promises an unwelcome guest in the house of 
contracts.32 As Kreitner explains, the" clean up project' meant, 
inter alia, setting a limitation on the freedom of contract of 
those who were engaged in gift giving and receiving as it 
denied them state enforcement that was available in the past.33 
Kreitner's rhetoric of cleansing is important for our 
discussion. While his analysis of the past remains "hygienic" 
and focuses on the positive and constructive purpose of the 
cleansing project,34 I want to add the mirror image: the 
negative and destructive side of the same reform; the 
ideological background that had led to the treatment of 
donative promises as if they were, to continue with the 
sanitization metaphor, waste. 
The argument that the disposal of donative promises was a 
chief means to the goal of the classical effort to redefine the 
consideration doctrine is well grounded in writings of the 
27 Id. at 1882. 
28 Id. at 1879. 
29 Id. at 1844. 
30 Id. at 1895. 
31 Id. 
32 Kreitner, supra note 26, at 1895. 
33 Id. at 1884-95. 
34 Generally, Kreitner argues that the reformulation of the consideration 
doctrine was aimed at "the constitution of a calculating individual subject, whose 
actions would be open to objective economic analysis, or economic rationality." Id. at 
1877-78. 
11
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time. 35 For example, Ballantine notes: 
The underlying principle of consideration would seem to be 
negative - a denial that ordinarily there is sufficient reason 
why gratuitous promises should be enforced.36 
Ballantine's words reveal a search for "sufficient reason" 
for enforcement and express the idea that without 
consideration there is no such reason and therefore "a denial" 
of enforcement follows. Yet, readers may ask why a "sufficient 
reason" is being required from donative promises, while the 
enforcement of bargained-for promises does not necessitate any 
special "reason" beyond the making of a promise. Reading 
more of Ballantine's text tells a bit more about the source of 
reluctance as he explains: 
From a nude pact no obligation arises. The courts have not 
felt impelled to extend a remedy to one who seeks to get 
something for nothing.37 
Ballantine's reasoning IS based on the lack of 
consideration; on the notion that making a promise to give 
something without receiving a reward in return can create 
nothing and is no more than '~nude pact." Why does the law 
have no "sufficient reason" for enforcement and why do the 
courts feel "impelled?" At first glance, it seems as if the 
reluctance had to do with the promisees who "seek to get 
something for nothing." Yet, in an enforcement regime 
promisees are reasonable to expect a fulfillment of promises 
given to them regardless of whether they have given something 
(of monetary value) in return. This suggests that the problem 
may reside elsewhere. What may have made the enforcement 
seem unreasonable is not so much receiving something for 
nothing, but probably the opposite of it: the giving of 
"something for nothing." In other words, the general 
misunderstanding, suspicion and undervaluation of giving 
behavior stand at the core of the classical decision to deny 
enforcement from donative promises. From a logical point of 
35 Id. at 1898 & n.51. 
36 Henry Winthrop Ballantine, Mutuality and Consideration, 28 HARv. L. REV. 
121, 121 (1914) (emphasis added). 
37 Id. (emphasis added). 
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view, enforcing a deal that is being perceived as "something for 
nothing" is an irrational act. However, basing a special 
unenforceability rule for donative promises on the lack of 
"sufficient reason" to enforce them is quite a tautological 
argument. The question is, therefore, what had the classical 
theorists seen in gift promising that had made them worried 
enough to engage in redefming the boundaries of contract law 
in a way that leaves them out? 
As, we shall now see, the classical resistance to donative 
promises can be explained by at least three accompanying 
ideological processes that took place at the times of the 
establishment of classical contract doctrine. Those three 
developments turned any link between contract law and 
intimate emotions into a threat to the status of contract law. 
1. Law as Science 
[I]t [i]s indispensable to establish at least two things: 
first, that law is a science .... 38 
The decisive quoted sentence, famously coming from 
Christopher Columbus Langdell, is one key to understanding 
the growing rejection of donative promises. Leading American 
legal education into its golden days, Langdell worked first and 
foremost to establish the profile of law-as-science.39 Contract 
law was one of the main vehicles through which Langdell made 
his scientific point. As Langdell explained: 
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles 
and doctrines .... It seemed to me, therefore, to be possible 
38 Christopher Columbus Langdell, Professor Langdell's Address in A RECORD OF 
THE COMMEMORATION, NOVEMBER FIFTH TO EIGHTH, 1886, ON THE TwO HUNDRED AND 
FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF HARVARD COLLEGE 85 (1887), quoted in 
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 109-10 (1974). 
39 Langdell, one of the founding fathers of our jurisprudence, was an admired 
Dean of Harvard Law School and the author of the first modern case book. Generally, 
his belief in law as a rational science and his efforts to shape it as such were highly 
influential. See Wai Chee Dimock, Deploying Law and Legal Ideas in Culture and 
Society: Rules of Law, Laws of Science, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 203, 204-05 (2001); 
Brett G. ScharfIs, Law as Craft, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2245, 2257-58 (2001). In the 
introduction to Langdell's book on contracts, he wrote, "It is indispensable to establish 
at least two things, first that law is a science; secondly that all the available materials 
of that science are contained in the printed books." See GILMORE, supra note 38, at 12; 
Kreitner, supra note 26, at 1896. 
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to take such a branch of the law as Contracts, for example, .. 
. and to select, classify and arrange all the cases which had 
contributed ... to the growth, development, or establishment 
of any of its essential doctrines.40 
The choice of contract law to spread the "law as science" 
message was not accidental, but deliberate. Contemporary 
commentators do not always remember that contract, as a 
distinct and paradigmatic field of law, was launched by 
Langdell.41 Writing the first modern casebook, devoted to a 
field of law that was not yet defined, allowed Langdell more 
freedom to construct a doctrine that would support his 
argument that law is indeed a science. Importantly to our 
focus on gifts, one third of the new book was dedicated to 
establishing the consideration doctrine and at the same time 
presented a prime example of "law as science."42 It 
demonstrated that legal actors could construct doctrine by a 
process as systematic and logical as that by which scientists 
cull and analyze relevant data. As chemists work in their 
laboratories, legal scientists work - as Langdell did - in the 
law library,43 where they "select, classify and arrange all the 
cases" in order to define or discover a more general principle or 
doctrine. 44 
The rebirth of consideration as a scientific doctrine and as 
part of the broader Langdellian project of marketing the "law 
as science" idea left little room for emotionally related promises 
such as donative promises. To appreciate the conflict between 
the emerging classical contract law, on the one hand, and gift-
promising with its emotional associations, on the other, it is 
important to understand that Langdell's definition of "science" 
was especially unwelcoming to emotions. Not trained in any of 
40 GILMORE, supra note 38, at 12 (emphasis added). 
41 Id. at 9-14 (describing the emergence of Contract Law as a field of law not in 
existence earlier and attributing the creation of "general theory of Contract" to 
Langdell - who launched the idea - and his successors Holmes and Williston, who 
"pieced it together"). 
42 Langdell's book had three chapters: Mutual Assent, Consideration and 
Conditional Contracts. See id. at 13. 
43 The comparison of laboratories and law libraries belongs to Langdell himself, 
who said, "The library is the proper workshop of professors and students alike; ... it is 
to all of us all that the laboratories of the university are to the chemists and physicists . 
. .. " See id. at 109 (quoting Langdell's speech from 1886). 
4' Id. 
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the then-acknowledged sciences, he held to a narrow one 
might say "impoverished" - view of science.45 To him science 
was an intellectual process of deduction and induction 
resulting from textually based acts of reading and writing: the 
ultimate expression of abstract logic and reason. Langdell saw 
law as "as an entirely self-contained geometric system of 
axioms, theorems, and proofs, generated by constructing the 
simplest and most elegant internally consistent set of 
principles ... ,,46 and, to him, logical consistency was what made 
law scientific. Such a process has the advantage of producing a 
set of concepts that in turn allow law to be and appear 
"rational," i.e. reason-based and predictable rather than 
arbitrary and uncontrolled.47 
Furthermore, as a person, Langdell has been described as 
cold and distanced from his own emotions,48 which perhaps 
made it natural for him to establish a doctrine that is aimed at 
detaching contract law from emotion-laden contexts such as 
promises to give gifts. It is of little wonder, therefore, that 
Langdell produced a view of contract law as "a remote, 
impersonal, bloodless abstraction,"49 and that eventually 
classical doctrine proved hostile to the highly personal and 
affectively motivated behavior of gift-promising. 
2. Objective Theory 
The law moved from "subjective" to "objective," 
45 Dimock, supra note 39, at 215-18 (discussing critical views of Langdell's 
perception of science). 
46 Thomas Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 819 
(1989). 
47 As a result, one was to adhere to the rules almost regardless of the 
consequences. Dimock, supra note 39, at 214. In a recent work, Professor Kimball has 
suggested that in reality Langdell's mode of reasoning was far more complex and less 
mathematical, but even according to his original analysis, Langdell is described as 
avidly promoting an appearance oflaw as science for the sake of keeping and restoring 
legal authority. See Bruce Kimball, LangdelJ on Contracts and Legal Reasoning: 
Correcting the Holmesian Caricature, 25 LAW & RIST. REV. 345, 395 (2007). 
48 Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyers-School? 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 908 
(1933). Frank portrayed Langdell as a bizarre character with "an obsessive and almost 
exclusive interest in books .... The lawyer-client relation, the numerous non-rational 
factors involved in persuasion of a judge at a trial, the face-to-face appeals to the 
emotions of juries, ... [were] virtually unknown (and [were] therefore meaningless) to 
Langdell .... The so-called case system ... was the expression of the strange character 
of a cloistered, retiring bookish man." 
49 GILMORE, supra note 38, at 13. 
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from "internal" to "external" 
from "informal" to "formal',so 
Langdell's contractual ideas were further developed by 
Oliver Wendell Holmes. To the pillars of logic and rationality 
coming from the "scientific" conceptualization of contract law 
Holmes added a new emphasis on objectivity.5! The shift away 
from subjectivity was quite remarkable: from the sixteenth to 
the early nineteenth century, contract formation depended 
upon the notion of a subjective "meeting of the minds." 
However, by the middle of the nineteenth century, in the same 
period that theorized the rejection of donative promises, "the 
tide had turned in favor of an objective theory of contract.',s2 
Importantly for our purposes, it was the newly defined 
doctrine of consideration that facilitated the move from 
subjectivity to objectivity. Langdell was probably the first to 
make the effort to disconnect law from subjectivity, clarifying: 
In order to eliminate the parties' subjective motives, . . . 
''benefit to the promisor is irrelevant to the question of 
whether a given thing can be made the consideration" and 
that a "detriment to the promisee is a universal test of the 
sufficiency of consideration.',53 
Holmes had followed Langdell by distinguishing an 
additional requirement as a condition for enforceability. Under 
what is known as "the bargain theory," Holmes had clarified 
that the mere presence of consideration will not suffice for 
enforcement. To belong with contract law and to be enforced, a 
promise should be bargained-for, i.e. induced by the 
consideration. Combined, those two points present a legal 
approach that disregards any subjective goal that may have 
50 [d. at 41 (quoting Holmes's words in his famous 1888 printed collection of 
lectures, "The Common Law"). 
61 Holmes is known for his critique of the Langellian idea of "law as science." 
However, his analysis drew heavily on Langdell's logic-oriented analysis to the point of 
"borrowing." See Kimball, supra note 47, at 367 ("One reason for the borrowing is that 
Holmes needed the expertise, not having carefully studied the subject of contracts. 
Another reason is that, in summer 1880, he was under 'deadline pressure for his 
contract lectures' scheduled for late fall."). 
62 See Allan Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 
945 (1967). 
63 Kimball, supra note 47, at 370 (citing CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, A 
SUMMARY OF THE LAw OF CONTRACTS 71 (1880» (emphasis added). 
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driven the promisor in making her promise. Instead, according 
to the newly developed approach, all that should matter is the 
presence of formal consideration, taken as an objective 
measure. Naturally, such an approach distances contract law 
from the parties' beliefs, intentions and feelings and shifts the 
legal attention away from everything they wished for or had in 
mind. It is almost needless to note how negative and 
unwelcoming to donative promises contract doctrine became 
after adopting such a formal and objective approach. 
3. Market Economy 
The law of contract is, therefore, roughly 
coextensive with the free market.54 
The exclusion of donative promises from contract law 
should also be considered in relation to the major effort made 
by classical contract theorists at the same time to connect their 
(new) field with the market world and distance it from the 
domestic arena. Creating an affinity between contract law and 
the market was an independent goal that made contract law 
far less receptive to donative promises, as the latter often 
originated far from the core of the market and in any case were 
clearly distinguishable from the stereotyped market behavior. 
The conceptualization of the modern market as a social 
institution remote from home is a relatively recent 
development; the segregation is accepted as one of the main 
consequences of the industrial revolution. 55 Historically, the 
transition to an industrial society controlled by a market 
economy has been an onerous process. It has brought about, to 
name only a few obvious detriments, harsh competition, 
instability, long hours of commute and work, growing social 
alienation, and weakening of familial and communal 
rt· t 56 suppo lve sys ems. 
The legal response to this harsh reality was part of a 
larger ideological effort to reduce people's mounting anxieties 
54 LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAw IN AMERICA 20-24 (1965). 
55 ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND 
INSTITUTION 46 (1986); see also Hila Keren, Can Separate Be Equal? Intimate 
Economic Exchange and the Cost of Being Special, 119 HARv. L. REV. F. 19 (2005). 
56 See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman & Peter Gabel, Contract Law as Ideology, in THE 
POLITICS OF THE LAW 497 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1990). 
17
Keren: Considering Affective Consideration
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2010
182 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
mainly by socializing them to develop a new belief in free-
market values. Under a wide, liberal pro-capitalist campaign, 
aimed at selling the market idea with its laissez-faire 
philosophy, it was claimed that what felt like alienation should 
be accepted as valuable self-interested individualism and that 
what was experienced as cruel competition is a logical and 
rational tactic that would eventually lead to economic success. 
In this nineteenth-century effort, classical contract law had an 
important role to play: on the one hand, by increasingly 
focusing on commercial transactions, it could signal a strong 
belief in the centrality of the market. On the other hand, by 
denying attention to "domesticity," it could portray the world of 
family and friends as a warm shelter and a kind of consolation 
to those daunted by the impersonal market. 
One immediate, practical way to adjust the legal message 
to the spirit of the period was by discriminating against 
promises less associated with the values of the profit-oriented 
and self-interested free market. The promises to give gifts, 
with their altruistic nature and their affinity to the domestic 
and personal spheres, were the first to stand in opposition to 
the stereotype of market behavior and as such to invite 
rejection. The process was figuratively described by Professor 
Friedman as a process of exclusion: 
Contract law expanded and narrowed its applicability to 
human affairs primarily through a process of inclusion and 
exclusion. The rules themselves changed less than the areas 
covered by them. 57 
In this atmosphere promises typical to the domestic, 
relational and intimate setting became unworthy of legal 
attention, underscoring the point that contract law's focus was 
on the market. Accordingly, attaching separate legal meanings 
to promises happening within the different spheres - the 
enforcement of commercial (bargained-for) promises versus the 
nonenforcement of non-economic (donative) promises - had an 
important role. It worked in chorus with the ideology of the 
day - both reflecting and reinforcing the newly drawn line 
between the spheres. When courts and theorists had later to 
explain the difference, their rhetoric highlighted a need to 
57 FRIEDMAN, supra note 54, at 20-24 (emphasis added). 
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respect the relational-domestic sphere and to protect it from 
the coldness of the law.58 However, as scholars in general and 
feminists in particular have argued, such "protection" from law 
actually worked in the opposite direction: it served to fortify 
the market at the expense of other arenas of human activity 
that were exposed to "lawlessness" and neglect.59 
4. Summary 
At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of 
the twentieth century, the three separate ideas of linking law 
with science, objectivism and the market had reinforced each 
other and had resulted in an accumulative negative impact on 
the legal status of donative promises. Unquestionably, the 
leading classical contract theorists, such as Langdell, Holmes 
and Williston, created and formulated a contract doctrine that 
influenced generations to corne. At the beginning of the 
twentieth century it was explicitly admitted that one of the 
goals of this new contract doctrine was to educate lay people to 
behave rationally.GO Promises to give that are not supported by 
expectations of tangible consideration were perceived as totally 
irrational and, in the spirit of the time, were denied the 
support of contract law and deemed unenforceable. However, 
the exclusion that resulted from a set of nineteenth-century 
ideologies survived the changes that were brought by the 
twentieth century, and new justifications for the 
unenforceability rule began to emerge. The corning section 
moves from the past to the present to discuss those more-recent 
explanations. 
58 In the famous case of Balfour v. Balfour, the court said: "Agreements such as 
these are outside the realm of contracts altogether. The co=on law does not regulate 
the form of agreements between spouses. Their promises are not sealed with seals and 
sealing wax. The consideration that really obtains for them is that natural love and 
affection which counts for so little in these cold Courts .... In respect of these promises 
each house is a domain into which the King's writ does not seek to run, and to which 
his officers do not seek to be admitted." Balfour v. Balfour, [1919] 2 K.B. 571, 579. 
59 MaIjorie M. Shultz, The Gendered Curriculum: Of Contracts and Careers, 77 
IOWAL. REV. 55, 58-59 (1991). 
60 Amy H. Kastely, Out of the Whiteness: On Raced Codes and White Race 
Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal and Contract Law, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 269,301 & 
n.115 (1994) (maintaining that "Justice Holmes said that citizens should be educated to 
'rational' behavior and racial division" and quoting him as saying in one of his public 
speeches, "If I am right it will be a slow business for our people to reach rational views, 
assuming that we are allowed to work peaceably to that end."). 
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B. CURRENT VIEWS 
With some important exceptions,61 most of the 
contemporary works that have explored the classical 
unenforceability of donative promises have ended up offering 
arguments in support of the status quo that are grounded in 
the disadvantages of enforcement. Even scholars who have 
admitted the value of legal enforcement of donative promises 
were reluctant to go as far as to recommend a reform and a 
move to an enforcement regime.62 How much of such enduring 
resistance to the enforcement of donative promises is still 
connected to their association with the relational and affective 
aspects of life? 
1. The Anti-Enforcement Arguments 
Along the years many arguments against enforcement 
have been raised, ranging from the most procedural to the 
more substantive. Yet, each of the many anti-enforcement 
arguments shares the assumption of difference. donative 
promises are so different from "normal" promises that the 
"regular" norm of enforceability cannot fit them. The literature 
concerning the unenforceability rule is vast and elaborate and 
does not seem to call for yet another summary. Alternatively, 
the chart below and the following analysis are aimed at 
reclassifYing the leading existing arguments against 
enforceability of donative promises and connecting them to the 
traditional resistance toward the emotions. The main 
arguments against enforcement can be divided into those that 
are made on behalf of the world of contracts and those that are 
61 See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains and Form, 64 IND. L. J. 155 (1989); 
Mark B. Wessman, Recent Defenses of Consideration: Commodification and 
Collaboration, 41 IND. L. REV. 9 (2008); Carol M. Rose, Giving, Trading, Thieving and 
Trusting: How and u-71y Gifts Become Exchanges and (More Importantly) Vice Versa, 
44 FLA. L. REV. 295 (1992); Carol M. Rose, Giving Some Back -- A Reprise, 44 U. FLA. L. 
REV. 365 (1992). 
62 A good example is a recent analysis by Professor Prentice, who has used 
Behavioral Law and Economics to illuminate the behavior of giving gifts and promising 
to give them. Although Professor Prentice is quite sympathetic to gift-giving and 
clearly appreciates its logic, he still concludes that even his analysis does not call for 
legal reform. Robert A. Prentice, "Law &" Gratuitous Promises, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 
881 (2007). See also Richard Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 411 (1977); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An 
Examination ofthe Basis of Contracts, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980). 
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made on behalf of the world of gift. They can then be 
summarized as follows: 
A. B. 
Protecting the World of Contract Protecting the World of Gift 
1) Donative promises are minor and A risk of imposed contract 
not important. (donative promises are not 
intended to be legally binding). 
2) Donative promises are too A risk of damaging the world of 
ambiguous. gift. 
3) Donative promises are impulsive 
and not well considered 
(impulsive). 
4) Donative promises are subjective, 
hard to prove, and easy to fabricate 
or manipulate. 
63 
Examination of the chart can highlight an interesting 
phenomenon: the arguments made from the perspective of the 
world of contract, while appearing to care about the value of 
this world, are in fact arguments regarding the problematic 
nature of the gift. Conversely, the arguments coming from the 
standpoint of the world of gift, while seeming to worry about 
this world, are in reality arguments about the nature of the 
opposite world, that of contract. Despite Eisenberg's rhetoric, 
it also seems evident that what he has entitled as the "world of 
contract" can be more precisely described as the "world oflaw." 
For example, looking at cell A(3) it seems clear that it is the 
law (of evidence), and not the contract, that has problems of 
proof. Similarly, as far as cell B(l) is concerned it is law rather 
than contract that is imposing itself when there is no indication 
of intention to be legally bound. Replacing the term "contract" 
with the term "law" can be a revealing exercise as it uncovers 
some of the tautological character of the arguments against 
enforceability. One may ask how the difference between the 
world of law and the world of gift can offer a satisfactory 
justification for the refusal oflaw to apply itself to gifts. 
The chart enables us to see that six main parameters are 
63 Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 827. 
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used to make the case for a fundamental difference between 
donative promises and commercial promises. Gifts are 
described as different from contracts by size [A(1)), clarity 
[A(2)], deliberativeness [A(3)], provability [A( 4)], legal intention 
[B(l)] and vulnerability to law [B(2)]. Nevertheless, those six 
parameters produce no clear line between the two groups of 
promises. Promises from both groups often reflect the same 
dollar value, enjoy similar - written - clarity, are based on 
analogous deliberativeness, present similar amenability to 
proof, and reflect a comparable intention to be legally binding. 
What remains is only the question whether the touch of law is 
going to damage the world of gift [B(2)].64 To return to the five 
other parameters, it seems clear that promises from the "world 
of contract" and promises from the "world of gift" can be so 
similar that scholarly insistence on differentiation becomes 
baffling. Is it possible, then, that in fact these are not the 
relevant sources of difference or parameters for comparison? 
The standard arguments against donative promises -
which suggest the impulsiveness, ambiguity, and unreliability 
of such promises - seem to apply less to actual examples of 
such promises (which can be, as shown in the case of Levine v. 
Barton,65 very deliberative and carefully defined) and more 
relevant to the emotions that are presumed to animate and 
underlie them. According to common myths, emotions - which 
are often, and erroneously, treated in the aggregate - are 
conceived as impulsive, transient, immature, and generally 
inferior as compared to deliberative, mature cognitive thinking. 
Such a view is prevalent among jurists, who have frequently 
contrasted such traits with their idealized view of the legal 
world. Richard Posner, for example, has bluntly argued: 
The less experienced a person is at reasoning through a 
particular kind of problem, the more likely that person is to 
"react emotionally," that is, to fall back on a more primitive 
mode of reaching a conclusion, the emotional. . . . Emotions, 
like sex, are something that we have in common with 
animals, who, having smaller cortexes than humans, rely 
more heavily than humans do on emotions to guide their 
64 See infTa Part III. 
65 Levine v. Estate of Barton (In re Barton), No. W2004-02913-COA-R3-CV, 2005 
Tenn. App. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2005). 
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actions.66 
The denial of legal recognition of promises to give gifts may 
thus be seen as a variation of the old resistance to the place of 
emotions in legal decisionmaking. Clearly, to some legal minds 
the status of contact law is still threatened by an association 
with the image of the emotions, much as it was in the days of 
Langdell. 
Taken together, the four arguments on the left side of the 
chart seem to protect contracts by portraying them as rational 
and not "emotional" (to use Posner's derogatory term). That 
message is communicated by rejecting donative promises which 
function in this context as a symbol of emotionalism. By 
refusing to enforce ostensibly impulsive promises, for example, 
the law denies its own uncontrolled dimensions and 
underscores its attributes of objectivity and reason. Such a 
structure suggests that the line between commercial promises 
and donative promises, and the following contract/gift 
dichotomy, are in fact rooted in a deeper dichotomy between 
law with its veneration of reason, on the one hand, and 
emotion, on the other. 
A similar reference to the dichotomies of contract/gift and 
reason/emotion is more directly made in the two arguments on 
the other side of the chart. While the question whether a 
promisor of a gift meant to be legally bound by her promise is a 
factual one, the argument that donative promises generally 
lack such intention seems to rest on an assumption that the 
affective origins of such promises render them innately non-
legal. The coming section discusses the dichotomous view 
created by these arguments against enforceability, to better 
understand what stands at the core ofthe durable resistance to 
donative promises. 
2. The Dichotomies in Con text 
The dichotomies of contract/gift and reason/emotion that 
animate the enduring separation between bargained-for 
promises and donative promises should not be seen in isolation. 
They follow from and rely on a series of other fundamental 
66 Richard A. Posner, Emotions vs. EmotionaHsm in Law, in THE PASSIONS OF 
LAw 309, 311 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999). 
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dichotomies that shape the liberal world and, working together, 
they all reinforce each other to create a reality almost 
axiomatic. Bargained-for promises are usually made in a 
commercial sphere and away from the domestic arena; their 
content is tangible, and-far from being elusiv~they have 
economic worth and not some personal value; this worth is 
definite and not vague, as it is perceived as being objectively 
dictated by the public market and not as subjectively 
determined by a private individual promisee; bargained-for 
promises are assumed to be a product of arm ~ length 
negotiation rather than of intimate and informal 
communications; those promises are motivated by 
individualism and self-interest and far less by communitarism 
and caring for others; and, having all those characteristics, 
bargained-for promises are often believed to be rational and not 
so emotional. Importantly, as one may immediately notice, 
bargained-for promises are much closer to the conventional 
image of law, where "reason in all its splendor,,67 supposedly 
'd 68 preSl es. 
This concert of dichotomies has a powerful effect. It makes 
the division appear natural and inevitable, and it conceals the 
intentional normative choice that courts have made. It also 
produces the strongest anti-enforcement argument left on the 
table in contemporary debates - Eisenberg's metaphor of two 
opposed worlds. Such a strong metaphor neatly captures the 
idea that, due to many dichotomies working in chorus, we are 
witnessing a gap far deeper than what can result from a mere 
difference - one which cannot, and, more significantly, should 
not be bridged. 
It is important to note that the "two worlds" idea 
essentially encompasses three layers of assumptions about 
human beings, their psychology and behavior, and the link 
between their lives and legal norms. At the first and most 
immediate level it suggests a substantial difference between 
the worlds. The two types of promises, it is argued, are 
dramatically different internally and externally. Internally, 
the promises differ in what motivates the promisor. While 
67 See Owen M. Fiss, Reason in All Its Splendor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 789 (1990). 
68 Note the correlation of all these dichotomies to the basic dichotomy of man v. 
woman. Bargained-for promises fit the masculine image while donative promises have 
qualities usually attached to the feminine. 
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bargained-for promises are made out of self-interest to earn a 
tangible reward, promises to gift result from the opposite 
motivation: an other-oriented decision to give up something 
valuable without expecting a reward. Externally, the entire 
context within which the promises are made is utterly 
disparate. Both in terms of location and atmosphere, the two 
sets of promises emerge in highly differentiated spheres - one 
in the market and the other far away from the market, one 
could say at "home." 
Such a stark difference is then followed by a seconct less 
recognized,69 layer of rivalry and mutual threat. The worlds 
are so different that any connection between them may 
endanger their existence. The point, which may be called "the 
contamination risk," is not only that the worlds are separated 
but that they should remain apart to avoid damage. Professor 
Eisenberg is vividly making the point by describing the danger 
to the world of gift: 
[M]uch of the world of gift is driven by affective 
considerations like love, affection, friendship, gratitude and 
comradeship. That world would be impoverished if it were to 
be collapsed into the world of contract.70 
In the third layer the gap between the "opposed worlds" 
has a vertical dimension of hierarchy. the worlds are not only 
different and hostile but also unequal in their status. This 
vertical structure is quite expected since whenever a 
dichotomous separation is defined, the human instinct 
responds by establishing a hierarchy.71 
69 Highlighting this under-acknowledged point is especially important because it 
tends to be more resilient to critique. See, e.g., Joan Williams & Viviana Zelizer, To 
Commodify or Not To Commodify: That Is Not the Question, in RETHINKING 
COMMODIFICATION 362, 364 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005). 
70 Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 847 (emphasis added). 
71 This was, for example, the ground for the political and legal rejection of 
"separate but equal" throughout the era of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954). According to postmodern philosophy the move from difference and separation 
to hierarchy is automatic and unavoidable. Once the human mind is differentiating 
experience, it immediately and compulsively turns to classify them as superior and 
inferior. See, e.g., GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND 
JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END, 117-18 (1995). For a similar point made with 
regard to the rejection of exchanges made in the intimate sphere, see Hila Keren, Can 
Separate Be Equal? Intimate Economic Exchange and the Cost of Being Special, 119 
HARv. L. REV. F. 19 (2005). 
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Professor Eisenberg's professed object of protecting the 
beauties of the world of gift from the impoverishing impact of 
the world of contract suggests a greater appreciation and care 
for the special world of gifts.72 However, in reality the rule of 
unenforceability produces the opposite hierarchy, which favors 
the world of contract. While it seems true that the rule aspired 
to sustain or enhance a simple separation between the two 
groups of promises, its vindication of that goal was not neutral 
in its effects. By excluding donative promises and denying 
their contractual validity the law has pronounced them inferior 
to "normal" promises, those made for recognized consideration 
and outside the familial/relational context. The legal refusal to 
enforce donative promises simultaneously serves as a sign of a 
general social devaluation of the world of gifts and an 
independent cause for such marginality.73 
As long as commercial promises are considered as purely 
logical acts, and donative promises are seen as emotional acts, 
the above hierarchy will continue to be highly impoverishing. 
If this is true, then the harm can be mitigated only by blurring 
the lines between reason-directed and affect-motivated 
exchanges. To accomplish that, it is essential to put aside the 
old assumptions about the emotions. 
3. Law-and-the-Emotions Ideas Applied 
As we have so far seen, the deliberate distancing of 
donative promises from contract law is a product of the 
fundamental belief in the estrangement of law and the 
emotions. It is at this point that the pioneering works done in 
the emerging field of "law and the emotions" offer a strong 
challenge to contract doctrine. Those works introduced the 
idea that emotions have a vital role to play in the legal world. 
This radical claim confronted a long intellectual tradition that 
dichotomized reason and emotion,74 and which construed legal 
72 See also Posner's argument that donative promises do not call for much legal 
enforcement, as they can rely on moral sanctions that are far less effective in the 
commercial world. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 
96 HARv. L. REV. 561, 622 (1983) (noting that contract law singles out the realm oflove 
and affection for special treatment, based on the assumption that family and friendship 
"neither need much law nor are capable of tolerating it"). 
73 Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains and Form, 64 IND. L. J. 155, 180-81, 189 (1989). 
74 See, e.g., Angela P. Harris & Marjorie M. Shultz, "A(nother) Critique of Pure 
Reason": Toward Civic Virtue in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1773, 1775 (1993) 
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thought as a professionally instilled cognitive process that 
could be powerfully unsettled by affective response. Law, it 
has been recently argued, is infused with emotions and has 
immense influence over people's emotions. Contrary to 
traditional belief, law cannot do justice without paying close 
attention to the affective dimension of life. Without taking 
emotions seriously, without understanding what may create 
and direct human feelings, and without dealing with the 
emotional consequences of legal actions, no "rational" 
decisionmaking is possible. Just as individuals without access 
to affective knowledge ("emotional intelligence") are limited by 
having misguided judgment, so too is the law. Affect-oriented 
understanding is vital, and the entire legal enterprise is at risk 
of being irrelevant and even harmful without it. 
From the perspective of the first current of law-and-the-
emotions scholarship, with its forceful call for legal attention to 
the emotions, the legal decision not to enforce promises to gift 
due to their affective "nature" is extremely problematic. After 
years of loyalty to a legal regime that is premised on an 
erroneous conception of the emotions, it is imperative to engage 
in an effort to better understand the affective structure of 
giving behavior, a proposition that is further discussed in the 
next Part. 
II. INVESTIGATION OF EMPATHY AND GRATITUDE 
A. EMPATHY AND ALTRUISM: GENERAL REVIEW 
This Part seeks to better understand the affective 
dimensions of gift promising. A promise to give a gift to 
another appears to be an unselfish gesture that suggests care 
for the promisee's welfare. On the face of things, it is an act of 
altruism: the promisor does not require any material reward 
from the promisee, and the decision to make the promise 
cannot be explained by traditional cost-benefit analysis. 
Earlier we have seen how contract law treats such altruistic 
behavior with great suspicion, as it directly conflicts with its 
rational-choice theory, according to which people are motivated 
by the desire to maximize their economic self-interests. But 
("Law schools operate at the junction of the academy and the legal profession. Both 
realms tend to polarize reason and emotion and to elevate reason."). 
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perplexity in the face of altruism is not unique to law: such 
other-oriented behavior, sometimes also referred to as "help," 
or "care,,,75 has been a source of puzzlement in other disciplines 
too. Darwin, for example, was driven "half-mad" by the 
challenge that the altruistic behavior of bees in hives presented 
to his theory of evolution by natural selection. 76 The altruistic 
behavior of the sterile bees who risk their lives in defense of 
the hive "would seem to be precisely the sort of trait that 
natural selection should operate against, and Darwin knew 
it.'077 Scholarly efforts to explain the altruistic behavior of 
animals and human beings has resulted in a monumental 
literature. As with Darwin in biology, anthropologists, 
psychologists, philosophers and other scholars have been 
challenged by patterns of behavior that do not seem to follow 
egoistic patterns. Is it possible that there is something beyond 
"The Selfish Gene,,?78 
One skeptical explanation is that what seems to be 
altruistic behavior is in fact an egoistic pattern in disguise. 
This approach, sometimes called "universal egoism," denies the 
possibility of "true altruism" or "pure altruism" and argues that 
the motivation for any behavior arises from the exclusive 
prospect of self-benefit.79 For example, we help a family 
member not because we care for her, but because we expect to 
benefit from keeping a good relationship with her, or because 
we anticipate a counter-favor of similar or larger value. The 
75 Moving on from the discussion of legal doctrine to the investigation of 
emotions requires some change of tone or tuning of language. In many non-legal 
disciplines the state of not knowing, or not knowing for sure, is much more typical and 
tolerable, and one of the consequences is that terminology and arguments tend to be 
more open-ended. Furthermore, the interdisciplinary nature of this investigation 
project demands navigation between different concepts while bridging gaps between 
dissimilar academic styles. It requires, for example, a discussion of results of a 
psychological experiment in concert with findings from brain-lab research and 
articulations of philosophical arguments. To enable free motion in such a diverse 
scholarly space, some preparation is in order. 
76 LEE ALAN DUGATKIN, THE ALTRmsM EQUATION: SEVEN SCIENTISTS SEARCH 
FOR THE ORIGINS OF GOODNESS 5-6 (2006). 
77 [d. at 2. 
78 RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976). Professor Dugatkin has said 
that Dawkins chose the metaphor to emphasize that genes that code for any trait that 
benefits the species as a whole are doomed for not maximizing their ("selfish") chances 
of being passed to the next generation. See DUGATKIN, supra note 76, at 4. 
79 C. Daniel Batson, Nadia Ahmad, David A. Lishner & Jo-Ann Tsang, Empathy 
and Altruism, in THE HANDBOOK OF POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 485-86 (C. R. Snyder & 
Shane J. Lopez eds., 2002). 
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universal-egoism approach has had a vast influence over many 
disciplines of scholarship: at least one scholar admitted that 
"[t]he flint-eyed researcher fears no greater humiliation than to 
have called some action altruistic, only to have a more 
sophisticated colleague later demonstrate that it was self-
• "80 servmg. 
An opposing argument is that altruism does truly exist, 
and human behavior cannot always be explained by selfish 
motives. At least outside the law, there appears to be a 
"paradigm shift" away from the earlier position that egoistic 
motives are the true explanation for every form of behavior 
that appears to be altruistic.81 The more recent view is that 
true altruism is an integral part of human nature.82 This is not 
a universal approach but a more pluralistic one: it 
acknowledges the place of self interest but also grants that true 
altruism is "within the human repertoire"83 and has important 
value for both individuals and society. 
To return to the legal question of donative promises, 
accepting the universal-egoism approach could have made the 
argument in favor of enforceability both easy and immediate. 
If every promise of a gift is actually a selfish transaction in 
disguise, then there should be no reason to distinguish these 
promises from their more conventional contractual 
counterparts or to see them as "unreasonable." According to 
the universal-egoism approach, Ballantine was wrong when he 
wrote that a gratuitous promise is about giving "something for 
nothing,',s4 because there is always "something" that is being 
expected by the promisor in return for her promise. 
Furthermore, the (selfish) benefits that motivated the promisor 
80 ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON 21 (1988). 
81 Jane Allyn Piliavin & Hong-Wen Charng, Altruism: A Review of Recent 
Theory and Research, 16 ANN. REV. SOC. 27, 27 (1990). "The flint-eyed researcher fears 
no greater humiliation than to have called some action altruistic, only to have a more 
sophisticated colleague later demonstrate that it was self-serving." FRANK, supra note 
80, at 21. 
However, this simple strategy of reducing all pro-social behavior to a more or 
less sophisticated form of egoism is nowadays much less popular than it used to 
be. Psychologists have collected convincing evidence for the existence of a 
genuine feeling of empathy, i.e., concern for others, in human beings. 
82 For additional discussion of this point, see infra, Part II.B. 
83 Batson et aI., supra note 79, at 486. 
84 Henry W. Ballantine, Mutuality and Consideration, 28 HARV. L. REV. 121, 121 
(1914). 
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can also satisfy the consideration requirement as they 
represent the required benefit to the promisor. Even the fear 
of contaminating the ''world of gift," which was raised by 
Professor Eisenberg, becomes irrelevant if one believes that in 
reality there is no such beautiful and vulnerable world that is 
moved by the care of human beings for each other. The egoistic 
approach cannot therefore offer justification for a rule of 
unenforceability. 
The status of promises to gift appears different, of course, 
if one pursues the more plural approach. In recognizing that at 
least partial altruism is possible, and may be elicited by a 
significant, genuine kind of other-oriented motivation, this 
approach suggests that the question of donative promises is 
more complex. It demands a better understanding of altruistic 
behavior and the emotions that may instigate it. 
From early philosophers such as David Hume86 and Adam 
Smith,86 to current psychologists such as Martin Hoffman87 and 
Daniel Batson,88 scholars have pointed to the set of emotions, 
loosely captured by the word "empathy" and sometimes jointly 
called the "empathetic emotions," as the possible basis for the 
altruistic behavior.89 Under different names, including 
"empathy," "sympathy," "compassion," "tenderness," "pity," and 
the like (hereinafter termed empathy or empathic emotion), 
scholars have emphasized an emotional response that is 
sincerely other-oriented and is elicited by and congruent with 
the perceived welfare of someone else.90 In recent years, 
scholars have become deeply engaged in researching empathy, 
85 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE 316 (Selby-Bigge ed., 1896) ("No 
quality of human nature is more remarkable . . . than that propensity we have to 
sympathize with others."); DAVID HUME, AN ENQUffiY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF 
MORALS 90,92 (App. 2) (Tom L. Beauchamp ed., Oxford University Press 1998) (1751) 
(rejecting the argument that "all benevolence is mere hypocrisy" and pointing to the 
existence of affections of "love, friendship, compassion [and] gratitude."). 
86 ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 1 (Anthony Finley 1817) 
(1759) (writing about "sympathy" and opening the discussion by arguing: "How selfish 
soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which 
interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, 
though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it. "). 
87 MARTIN L. HOFFMAN, EMPATHY AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
CARING AND JUSTICE (2000). 
88 C. DANIEL BATSON, THE ALTRUISM QUESTION (1991) (reviewing the literature 
and suggesting the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis). 
89 Batson et al., supra note 79, at 486. 
90 Id. 
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animated and assisted by two important developments. The 
first is a growing interest in positive emotions, and a 
corresponding investigation into their individual and social 
value and importance. The second is a body of technological 
advances that have allowed neuroscientists to link feelings of 
empathy with certain recognizable activity in the brain.91 
In many of the works dedicated to empathy, the line 
between altruistic behavior and the emotion(s) that motivate it 
has been blurred. In some cases, no clear distinction has been 
made between feeling empathy and acting in an altruistic way. 
Some theorists define the empathic emotion itself as including 
several dimensions, the last of which is motivational and is 
taken as leading directly to a behavioral effort to help or 
benefit another.92 Others, often more focused on altruism, seem 
to view the altruistic motivation as an external result of 
experiencing empathetic emotions. In any case, there seems to 
be considerable evidence that feeling empathy increases 
altruistic behavior.93 The Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis of 
Batson is a frequently cited explanation for the direct and 
causal connection between the empathic emotion and the 
readiness to help others. Batson argued that, from traditional 
philosophy to recent psychology, "the most frequently 
mentioned possible source of altruistic motivation is an other-
oriented emotional reaction to seeing another person in need.,,94 
He then suggested a model that outlines three paths that lead 
from empathy to the end result of helping behavior. Two of the 
three paths are indeed induced by empathy but are still 
egoistic and therefore - as in the universal egoism analysis -
point toward treating donative promises as bargains. If, for 
example, as Batson's model suggests, one may selfishly decide 
91 See, e.g., Stephanie D. Preston & Frans B. M. de Waal, Empathy: Its Ultimate 
and Proximate Bases, 25 BEHA V. & BRAIN SCI. 1 (2002), and the many responses to that 
article written by leading scholars in the field of empathy and published by the same 
journal in the same volume. 
92 See, e.g., ROBERT C. SOLOMON, A PASSION FOR JUSTICE 230-31 (1990) (arguing 
that compassion is not just a feeling but also a motive for acting). 
93 See, e.g., R. Buck & P. Ginsburg, Emotional Communication and Altruism: 
The Communicative Gene Hypothesis, in ALTRUISM: REVIEW OF PERSONALITY AND 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: VOL. 12 149 (M. S. Clark ed., 1991); Nancy Eisenberg & Paul 
Miller, The Relation of Empathy to Pro-Social and Related Behaviors, 101 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 91 (Jan. 1987). 
94 Batson et al., supra note 79, at 486. 
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to help in order to get a personal reward,95 then the way to 
finding consideration that will allow enforcement does not 
seem to be too long. The third path in Batson's model is the 
empathy-altruism hypothesis, "the hypothesis that feeling 
empathy for a person in need evokes altruistic motivation to 
help that person,,96 and that "the greater the empathic emotion 
the greater the altruistic motivation.'097 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to catalogue the 
knowledge gained in a range of disciplines concerning empathy 
and its role in motivating altruistic behavior. Instead, the 
framework of law and the emotions will be used. Focusing on 
the "law" component, the structure of the discussion will follow 
the leading legal arguments against enforcement. Then, these 
arguments will be linked (the "and" component) to the emotions 
throughout exploration of some relevant sections of the non-
legal understandings of empathy.98 As we shall now see, the 
non-legal information tends to undermine the common 
objections to enforceability. 
B. EMPATHY IS NATURAL 
Donative promises seem to conflict with the concept of "the 
Selfish Gene" and with the widespread assumption that people 
are motivated only by their self interests and that true 
altruism is an illusion. This conflict was transformed by some 
jurists into a general disbelief toward donative promises and a 
grave suspicion that they are "exceptionally easy to fabricate.'099 
In contrast to such disbelief, non-legal research consistently 
suggests reasons to trust such promises as natural and 
95 This is part of Batson's first path. Id. In addition to an anticipated reward 
and included in the first path, one may selfishly help to avoid a sanction. Id. The 
second path is helping out of a selfish goal of reducing the distress caused to the helper 
from witnessing the suffering of another. Id. This path may lead to helping behavior, 
but it may also lead to detachment that seeks to avoid the situation altogether (no 
helping behavior). Id. 
96 C. DANIEL BATSON, THE ALTRUISM QUESTION 74 (1991). 
97 Batson et al., supra note 79, at 488. 
98 This pragmatic choice will admittedly leave out some important questions that 
are the main focus of empathy scholars but I hope that it will contribute more to the 
subject at hand. 
99 Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 827 & n.22. (presenting the common argument 
that "donative promises are exceptionally easy to fabricate" as made in Lon L. Fuller, 
Consideration and Form, 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 799 (1941), and in other works cited in 
note 22 of his article). 
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authentic. For example, Dacher Keltner has compellingly 
argued that as human beings we have a compassionate 
instinct, which manifests itself in many nonverbal and 
spontaneous manners: through the expressions of our face, the 
beat of our heart, the levels of our hormones and even the 
activity in our brain. lOo Apparently, young children show a 
particular facial expression (oblique eyebrows, concerned gaze) 
when they empathize with another. Similarly, the heart rate of 
people who feel empathy goes below its baseline level and the 
levels of a special hormone (Oxytocin) increases when people 
behave in a caring way. And, perhaps most exciting, the brain 
shows demonstrable neurological reaction in response to others 
- both relatives and strangers - who are in need. Furthermore, 
the empathic emotion is not only deeply rooted in the brain and 
in the body but can also be communicated, i.e., both expressed 
and understood, without words, by a simple touch of hands. 101 
This last point suggests that the empathic emotion is 
something people are capable of feeling, conveying and 
comprehending even before language or texts, i.e., as a part of 
human nature. 
The inclination to feel and show empathy gains additional 
support from scholarship on moral development, which 
demonstrates that feelings of empathy are not only natural but 
also inevitable. Psychologist Martin Hoffman has pointed to 
the existence of five distinct modes of empathic arousal. 
According to Hoffman the first three modes are "preverbal, 
automatic and essentially involuntary.,,102 Recognizing those 
involuntary modes here is important not because they can 
explain a decision to give a gift or promise it. They cannot. 
Those three preverbal modes are apparently too automatic and 
too cognitively underdeveloped to lead to such behavior. 
Recognizing those involuntary modes is important, however, 
since it shows that humans are built in such a way that not 
100 Dacher Keltner, The Compassionate Instinct, in THE COMPASSIONATE 
INSTINCT: THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN GOODNESS 9-11 (Dacher Keltner, Jeremy Adam 
Smith, & Jason Marsh eds., 2010); Stephanie D. Preston and Frans B. M. de Waal, 
Empathy: Its Ultimate and Proximate Bases, 25 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1 (2002). 
101 Id. at 12 (describing an experiment in which two strangers were put in a room 
where they were separated by a barrier, and reporting that "people in these 
experiments reliably identified compassion ... from the touches to their forearm."). 
102 MARTIN L. HOFFMAN, EMPATHY AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
CARING AND JUSTICE 5 (2000). 
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only enables them to emotionally respond to the needs of others 
but also compels them to do SO.103 
Finally, the conceptualization of empathy and altruistic 
motives as normal and natural can also get support from 
looking at the flip side of the coin. In the world of psychiatry, 
which struggles with defining "abnormalities," the inability to 
feel empathy and/or to communicate such emotion is a 
significant indication of certain personality disorders. The 
symptoms of a narcissist personality disorder, as a prime 
example, are defined by the most recent Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual (DMS) - IV and they explicitly include "lack 
of empathy.,,104 As Professor Nussbaum reminds us, having 
empathy is the normal state while "typically we will be right to 
find a person without empathy frightening and 
psychopathic. ,,105 
C. EMPATHY IS COGNITIVE 
As mentioned earlier, one explanation for the 
unenforceability of donative promises is that they are 
'd d t b t . l' 106 hI d 107 '11 conSI ere 0 e 00 lmpu Slve, ras y rna e, -
considered,108 and lacking proper deliberation. 109 These 
assumptions are rarely explained, but rather are presented as 
if they reflect a basic truth, one that does not call for 
demonstration or proof. As a threshold matter, these 
assumptions rely on an image of emotions as if they were 
103 I d. 
104 P. J. Watson, Stephanie O. Grisham, Marjorie V. Trotter & Michael D. 
Biderman, Narcissism and Empathy: Validity Evidence for the Narcissistic 
Personality Inventory, 48 J. PENS. AsSESS. 301 (June 1984). 
105 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF 
EMOTIONS 334 (2001). 
106 Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 799 (1941) 
("Again, it is said that enforcement is denied gratuitous promises because such 
promises are often made impulsively and without proper deliberation."). 
107 Geoffrey Mead, Free Acceptance: Some Further Consideration, 105 L.Q.R. 460, 
466 (1989) ("The courts will not normally enforce a gratuitous promise unless the 
promise is made under seal. A plausible rationale of this rule is that there is thought to 
be a risk that gratuitous promises might be made rashly and on the spur of the 
moment, without careful thought.") (emphasis added). 
108 ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 52 (3d ed. 1999). 
109 Andrew Kull, Reconsidering Gratuitous Promises, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 53-54 
(1992) ("[G]ratuitous promises in general are made without proper deliberations .... ") 
(emphasis added). 
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impulses, an image whose general flaws were discussed earlier. 
Yet, with regard to the connection between the emotions and 
law, the more central question is whether the concrete emotion 
of empathy, which is considered to be the chief motivator for 
gift promising, truly fits with such an impulsive image. 
Recent years have seen a major change in the way scholars 
view emotions. The view of emotions as connected to cognition 
- as shaped by thoughts and as influencing judgments - has 
been ascendant in many recent efforts to theorize the 
emotions. 110 Academic and more-popular works reflect a 
growing understanding that, without the information coming 
from our emotions, no intelligent decisionmaking is even 
possible. lll Now supported by contemporary research of the 
brain, this emerging view departs sharply from the impulsive 
profile assumed by scholarship.112 As Kahan and Nussbaum 
make clear, such cognitive notions should be understood 
against the backdrop of a long debate occurring in different 
disciplines about the nature of emotions. What they call "the 
mechanistic view" holds that "emotions are forces more or less 
devoid of thought or perception" and that emotions are 
"impulses or surges."l13 Obviously, that is the view which 
correlates with the current resistance to the enforcement of 
donative promises, which are accepted as affectively motivated. 
The opposite view, often named "the evaluative view,,,114 sees 
the lines between emotions and cognition as blurred: it 
emphasizes that emotions are shaped by preexisting cognitive 
appraisals and - at the same time - shape people's (cognitive) 
I t · . r. d 115 eva ua IOns gomg lorwar . 
110 Richard Lazarus, Thoughts on the Relations Between Emotions and 
Cognition, 37(9) A.\1. PSYCHOL. 1019, (1982). 
111 DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE: WHY IT CAN MATTER MORE 
THAN IQ (1996). 
112 KEITH OATLEY, DACHER KELTNER & JENNIFER M. JENKINS, UNDERSTANDING 
EMOTIONS 21 (2d ed. 2006) (explaining that "[mlost researchers now assume that 
emotions follow appraisals of an event, a view similar to Aristotle's idea of emotions as 
evaluations"). 
113 Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in 
Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 277-78 (1996). For a more elaborate discussion 
by Nussbaum, see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE 
INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS 19-79 (2001). 
114 Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 113, at 277-78. 
115 Law-and-the-emotions scholars have used those ideas to argue that if some 
emotions have the structure of cognition, and cognition itself often functions in an 
intuitive, affective way, then bringing the two together by recognizing the place of 
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In Descartes' Error, for example, Antonio Damasio points 
to the imprecise and misleading character of the 
reason/emotion dichotomy.1I6 To him emotions are forms of 
intelligent awareness: "just as cognitive as other percepts."l17 
Once the sharp distinction is removed, two arguments unfold. 
On the one hand, works by scholars such as Martha Nussbaum 
demonstrate that many emotions have a cognitive structure: 
they embody judgments about the objects to which they 
respond that have a kind of logical structure. llS On the other 
hand, psychologists such as Jonathan Haidt describe the 
process of cognitive decisionmaking as embodying vital 
affective components.1l9 In one experiment, for example, people 
who received a gift while shopping in a mall became happier, 
and without being aware of it, evaluated their cars as 
performing better than control subjects who had received no 
·ft 120 gI. 
This general appreciation of the cognitive dimensions of 
emotion is particularly relevant to the empathetic emotions 
that motivate gift-promising. Emotion theories that 
distinguish emotions as "basic" versus "non-basic" classifY 
empathy as a non-basic emotion. 121 Comparing empathy with 
emotions in law does not seem anomalous after all. See OATLEY ET AL., supra note 112, 
at 21; Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 113, at 277-78; MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, 
UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS 334 (2001). For a review of 
the development of that argument in law-and-the-emotions scholarship, see Kathryn 
Abrams & Hila Keren, ~o~ AlTaid of Law and the Emotions? 94 Minn. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2010). 
116 ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR xv (1994). 
117 Id. 
118 See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE 
OF EMOTIONS 334 (2001); ANDREW ORTONY ET AL., THE COGNITIVE STRUCTURE OF 
EMOTIONS (reprint 1990) (1988); Richard Lazarus, Universal Antecedents of the 
Emotions, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION 163-64 (Paul Ekman & Richard J. Davidson 
eds., 1994) (arguing that emotions consist of "motivational, cognitive, and coping 
activities that orient . . . creatures selectively to relevant features of their 
environments"). 
119 Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social 
Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108(4) PSYCHOL. REV. 814, (2001) 
(explaining how cognition works on two tracks, one that functions instantaneously and 
intuitively, and another that proceeds through conscious, temporally sustained, logical 
operations). 
120 The experiment was made by Alice Isen and colleagues. OATLEY ET AL., supra 
note 112, at 24. Remarkably, the positive emotion induced by the gift regularly 
increased the subjects' inclination to sympathize or provide help, a point that will be 
further discussed here. See infra Part I1.E (discussing gratitude and reciprocity). 
121 LAUREN WISPE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SYMPATHY 89-92, 161,177 (1991). For a 
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archetypal "basic" emotions such as fear or anger, such theories 
describe empathy as more cognitive, more conscious, and less 
intense than those emotions.122 To feel empathy or sympathy in 
a manner developed enough to motivate an altruistic response, 
one must have experienced substantial, sophisticated cognition. 
Hoffman's five modes of empathic arousal (mentioned 
earlier) demonstrate the fashion in which cognition plays a role 
in the development of empathy in children. According to his 
studies, the first three modes which are preverbal and 
involuntary are followed by two additional "higher-order 
cognitive modes.,,123 His developmental scheme emphasizes 
how the kind of empathy that can motivate helping behavior 
requires cognitive processes that exist only in advanced stages 
of development. 124 Observing the growth of a sense of a 
separated self in young children, Hoffman describes several 
phases of progress. He explains how children start with 
experiencing the needs and distresses of others as if they were 
their own; then they begin to realize the distress is not their 
own but still try to help the others by doing what would soothe 
them. 125 Only later in life, when children reach more cognitive 
maturity, can they see beyond themselves and recognize the 
separate condition of the others and the distinct ways to help 
them.126 In those higher phases of development children need 
to draw, not only on their affective response, but also on verbal 
information regarding the other, their knowledge about the 
other's life condition, and general information they have 
acquired about the world.127 The complex cognitive process that 
discussion of basic (or primary) emotions, see, e.g., ROBERT PLUTCIDK, THE 
PSYCHOLOGY AND BIOLOGY OF EMOTION 53-64 (1994); RICHARD LAzARus, EMOTIONS 
AND ADAPTATION 79-82 (1991). For a critical view of such classification of the emotions, 
see, e.g., Paul Ekman, All Emotions Are Basic, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION 15-19 (Paul 
Ekman & Richard J. Davidson eds., 1994). 
122 See, e.g., Nancy Eisenberg & Richard A. Fabes, Empathy; Conceptualization, 
Measurement and Relation to Prosodal Behavior, 14 MOTIVATION AND EMOTION 131, 
144 (1990) (arguing that "caring, compassion, sympathy and pity are seen as somewhat 
lower in intensity"). 
123 MARTIN L. HOFFMAN, EMPATHY AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
CARING AND JUSTICE 5 (2000); see also WISPE, supra note 121, at 132-33 (discussing 
the relationship of affect and cognition in sympathy). 
124 HOFFMAN, supra note 124, at 6. 
125 Id. at 63-71 (describing the first few stages of development, which do not allow 
(yet) for an other-focused empathetic act). 
126 Id. at 71-80. 
127 Id. at 80-92. 
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is required in those more advanced stages is a precondition for 
fully developed acts of empathy to benefit another.128 
In her seminal book, Upheavals of Thought, Martha 
Nussbaum reviews and analyzes the cognitive requirements for 
having the empathic emotions (which she terms 
"compassion,,).129 Her approach offers philosophical grounding 
to Hoffman's developmental argument. Drawing on Aristotle, 
who originally defined the cognitive requirements for an 
empathic motivation, she explains that this emotion has three 
cognitive elements: 
the judgment of size (a serious bad event has befallen 
someone); the judgment of nondesert (this person did not 
bring the suffering on himself or herself); and the 
eudaimonistic judgment (this person, or creature, is a 
significant element in my scheme of goals and projects, an 
end whose good is to be promoted).130 
Nussbaum's approach, like Hoffman's, suggests that the 
evolution of an empathic emotion involves cognitive reactions 
that make it less a burst of feeling than· a gradual, controlled, 
sustained, logical process. With respect to Nussbaum's second 
cognitive dimension, for example, the empathic person is 
engaged in an elaborate analysis of the question of fault in an 
effort to make sure the potential beneficiary of his help is 
indeed worthy of receiving it. "Insofar as we do feel 
compassion," explains Nussbaum, "it is either because we 
believe the person to be without blame for her plight or 
because, though there is an element of fault, we believe that 
her suffering is out of proportion to the fault.,,131 The exercise is 
almost a mathematic one and "[c]ompassion then addresses 
itself to the non blameworthy increment.,,132 
Convincing support for this calculating view can be found 
in Candace Clark's sociological research on American 
approaches to empathic feeling (which she terms 
128 Id. at 7,90. 
129 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF 
EMOTIONS 334 (2001). 
130 Id. at 321. 
131 I d. at 311. 
132 Id. 
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"sympathy"). 133 Based on numerous qualitative interviews, 
Clark describes "our sympathy logic" as one that includes a 
culpability analysis. 134 "The sympathy a person feels," she 
argues, "is contingent on where on the luck-responsibility 
continuum he or she assigns the other's problem.,,135 For 
example, her interviewees had almost no doubt that hurricane 
victims deserve sympathy but were more ambivalent with 
regard to the miseries of an alcoholic law student and even less 
empathic when thinking about an employee who stole a 
chicken from her boss. 136 Clark explains that in the evaluation 
process people "must weigh responsibility against luck and 
against severity"137 and she reports that "some ... respondents 
who ultimately sympathized explained that the severity of the 
problem outweighed the characters' culpability (e.g., 'She 
probably shouldn't have talked to the guy in the bar, but no one 
deserves to be beaten.').,,138 Overall, Clark's findings correlate 
with Hoffman's and Nussbaum's views and indicate a complex 
assessment process in which cognition is an indispensable part 
of the development of an empathic emotion. 
The strong cognitive dimensions of empathic emotion 
elaborated above call for reconsideration of the assumption 
that donative promises are made impulsively. Moreover, the 
investigation of empathy suggests an even stronger challenge 
to the classic impulsive explanation of the unenforceability 
rule. Perhaps counter-intuitively, research shows that 
impulsiveness is more related to refraining from altruistic 
behavior than to engaging in it. Having uncontrolled feelings 
of empathy due to empathic over-arousal (or under-regulation) 
may cause a shift of attention from the other, whose condition 
had triggered the emotion, to the empathetic self who feels 
severe distress. That shift, in turn, may lead to a self-
interested motivation for detachment aimed at relieving the 
anxiety by ignoring rather than by acknowledging the other's 
condition. It is true that, at least according to Batson, some 
altruism is motivated by an effort to relieve the distress by 
ending the suffering of the other. However, Batson himself, as 
133 CANDACE CLARK, MISERY AND COMPANY: SYMPATHY IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1997). 
134 Id. at 100. 
135 Id. at 101. 
136 Id. at 103-04. 
137 Id. at 105. 
138 Id. 
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well as others, has also argued that when possible a more 
common response would be to escape the situation altogether, 
i.e., not to respond to the other's needs. Interestingly, and 
significantly to the current context, researchers have found 
that it is the ability not to be impulsive that underlies acts of 
giving, while the impulsive response may direct people to avoid 
the other rather than to relate to her problems. Indeed, 
"people who are skilled at regulating their emotion and 
behavior are not only more likely to feel concern for [others], 
but also are relatively likely to help others.,,139 
Finally, even beyond this general cognitive profile of 
empathy, the promises to give gifts that have occupied courts 
seem especially distant from impulsive response. First, as 
promises that anticipate the act of giving (while postponing the 
actual giving behavior), they are imaginative acts that require 
futuristic planning and elaborated thought. Second, being 
verbally articulated and often written or even legally framed by 
professionals, such promises involve cognitive processes beyond 
the level required for developing empathy. And third, at least 
in the case of written promises, the length of time and the level 
of awareness that are necessary for the completion of the task 
offer little justification for seeing the promise as impulsive. 
D. EMPATHY IS REWARDING 
Part of the suspicion directed toward donative promises is 
based on the belief that they are promises to give "something 
for nothing,,140 and as such fail to provide any logic for the 
desire to give. And yet, at least outside the law, scholars 
increasingly understand that the notion that givers get 
"nothing" in return is nothing but a myth. What are the 
rewards attached to feeling and expressing empathy? 
139 Nancy Eisenberg, Claire Hofer & Julie Vaughan, EffortfUl Control and Its 
Socioemotional Consequences, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTION REGULATION 287, 299 (James 
Gross ed., 2007). 
140 Ballantine, supra note 84, at 121. Ballantine wrote: "From a nude pact no 
obligation arises. The courts have not felt impelled to extend a remedy to one who 
seeks to get something for nothing. English law accordingly will not usually enforce a 
promise unless it is given for value, or the promise of value." 
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1. Egoistically Motivated Rewards 
An obvious case of benefit is where the reward for the 
promised gift is tangible. A giver also may promise to donate 
with an expectation, not necessarily phrased as a precondition, 
that her gift will become known to the world and will thereby 
increase her reputation. The world of charitable subscriptions, 
for example, is full of donors' names on walls, on chairs, in 
programs, on banners - all of which celebrate, and publicize, 
virtues of the donors. Publicizing a donation sends out a clear 
double message: first, that the donor is capable of giving; and 
second, that the donor is moral, generous and honorable. A 
similar mechanism is at work when the gift is promised to 
accomplish the promisor's goal of establishing or strengthening 
a relationship with the promisee. 141 The reward in those cases 
cannot be clearer. 
Batson's empathy-altruism hypothesis underscores such 
obvious rewards and points to two additional forms of return. 
One may promise to give in order to satisfy a social norm, in an 
effort to avoid the social cost of nonconformity. For example, 
parents or grandparents may promise to fund their offspring's 
college tuition out of an anxiety that refusing to pay for higher 
education will negatively mark them in their community. 
Avoiding this social cost may be experienced as the reward. A 
similar logic is present in the second path described by Batson: 
one may promise to give in order to relieve the distress caused 
by empathic arousal in response to the needs (or even misery) 
of others. 
The three rewards discussed so far - from seeking more 
reputation, through attempting to satisfy a social norm, to 
looking for a sense of relief - are all egoistically motivated,142 
141 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law ofGifls and 
Gratuitous Promises, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 567, 603-06 (1997) (observing that many 
promises are made to initiate or further trust-based relationships). The case of Levine 
v. Estate of Barton is a possible example, as Mr. Barton's promise to his beloved Ms. 
Levine reads as aimed to help her but also suggests that Mr. Barton was interested in 
having her closer to him after a period of long-distance relationship. Levine v. Estate 
of Barton (In re Barton), No. W2004-02913-COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXIS 825 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2005). 
142 These three rewards are nevertheless different in their connection to empathy. 
While observable rewards have nothing to do with feeling empathy, the reward coming 
from the saving of social costs is a case of responding to the social scripting of empathy 
and pretending to feel it without having enough of the actual sentiment. The effort to 
relieve self-distress reflects a problem of managing empathy that is actually felt but is 
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in that the satisfaction of the needs of the giver - and not the 
needs of the recipient - is the main source of the reward. This 
is obvious if the reward is evident, as in the case of making a 
gift public, but even in the more implicit cases, the promisor is 
aiming at satisfying her own self-interest and the benefit 
conferred on the promisee is merely a side effect. It can also be 
said that the recipient's well-being is being used as a means to 
benefit the donor: in agreeing to receive the gift, the promisee 
enables the giver to receive something in exchange, be it 
increased reputation, social conformity or emotional relief. 
Overall, these three situations do not fit the formula of 
"something for nothing," and in fact have a better correlation 
with the conventional "quid pro quo" formula. 
2. Beyond Egoistic Rewards 
Even when feeling empathy motivates a truly altruistic 
form of behavior (Batson's hypothesis) there may still be 
rewards to the giver, often quite significant. Those rewards are 
of two main kinds: independent rewards that spring 
irrespective of reciprocity, and rewards that are "paid back" by 
the recipient. The reciprocal rewards will be discussed below;143 
here the focus will be on the reward that comes from the 
pleasure of giving. This autonomous and independent reward 
is sometimes captured by the maxim "giving is receiving"; it 
suggests that an important form of reward inheres in the act of 
giving itself. 
The pleasure of giving is familiar to anyone who has ever 
given a present. It simply feels good. The good feeling usually 
extends beyond the moment of giving: it begins with 
contemplating the giving, progresses to the preparation of the 
gift, and reaches a zenith when the actual giving is taking 
place, especially if the gift is well received. The pleasure may 
not well-regulated. On scripting emotions, see Cheshire Calhoun, Making Up 
Emotional People: The Case of Romantic Love, in THE PASSIONS OF LAw 217 (Susan 
Bandes ed., 1999). A vivid description of the altruist script can be found in a New York 
Times article: "We preach altruism to our children and occasionally even practice it 
ourselves. Viewers of 'American Idol' were not surprised to see even Simon Cowell 
sounding like Albert Schweitzer when he visited sick children in Africa; we expect at 
least a show of altruism from everyone." John Tierney, Taxes a Pleasure? Check the 
Brain Scan, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2007 (emphasis added) (reporting an Oregon 
University experiment discussed in the text accompanying note 15049 infra). 
143 See infra Part II.E. 
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also last long after the giving moment (or fade and then 
reappear), warming the heart of the giver when pleasant 
memories surface. The warmth associated with giving has 
been described as coming from within and therefore as 
different from the externally derived rewards discussed earlier. 
Researchers report that the altruistic behavior is accompanied 
by "feelings of self-satisfaction and . . . a rise in . . . self-
esteem."144 Some works have used the term "warm glow" - "the 
joy of giving" - in reference to such internal rewards. 145 
In the Levine v. Estate of Barton case, the promise of Mr. 
Barton to his lover included a direct reference to the pleasure 
of giving. 146 His note to Ms. Levine said: 
If your desire is to move back to Memphis or any other part 
of the country, please do not hesitate because of financial 
concerns. Knowing this would be extremely hard for you to 
do, it would give me a great deal of pleasure to know I helped 
. 11 147 III some sma way. 
Recent works in the field of neuroscience provide 
confirming evidence of the pleasure that arises from giving. 
Reporting on research by Professors Rilling and Berns, 
144 Daniel Bar-Tal, R. Shaharabany & A. Raviv, Cognitive Basis for the 
Development of Altruistic Behavior, in COOPERATION AND HELPING BEHAVIOR: 
THEORIES AND RESEARCH 387 (Derlega & Grzelak eds., 1982). 
145 Adam Smith recognized the "warm glow" effect long ago, noting that "[wle are 
pleased to think that we have rendered ourselves the natural objects of approbation, .. 
. and we are mortified to reflect that we have justly merited the blame of those we live 
with .... " ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 117 (Grin Verlag 2009) 
(1759). However, the term "warm glow" is sometimes used as including a mixture of 
external and internal rewards. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice, "Law &" Gratuitous 
Promises, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 881, 885 (2007) (arguing that "warm glow may come 
from helping others, from being public spirited, or from following the rules of society or 
of morality"); James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A 
Theory of Warm-Glow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464, 464 (1990). As a result of this broad 
definition of the warm glow, it is sometimes interpreted as a selfish motivation for an 
altruistic behavior. For example, the first path of Batson's model seems to include, as 
equally egoistic, both the reward of gaining social approval (external reward) and the 
reward of seeing oneself as a good person (internal reward). C. DANIEL BATSON, THE 
ALTRUISM QUESTION: TOWARD A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ANSWER 77 (1991). At points 
Batson appears to be even more extreme in arguing that even the anticipation of 
internal rewards without additional external rewards can render an act egoistic rather 
than altruistic. 
146 Levine v. Estate of Barton (In re Barton), No. W2004-02913-COA-R3-CV, 2005 
Tenn. App. LEXIS 825 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2005). 
147 Id. at *2 (emphasis added). 
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Professor Keltner has concluded that "[h]elping others 
triggered activity in the caudate nucleus and anterior 
cingulate, portions of the brain that turn on when people 
receive rewards or experience pleasure.,,148 . In a more-recent 
experiment, students at the University of Oregon got $100 and 
were asked to make decisions about whether to give money to a 
local food bank. 149 They were also asked to respond to 
mandatory, tax-like transfers of their money to the same food 
bank. Throughout the process the students' brain activity was 
measured by using functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI). 
Earlier studies had shown that activity in certain areas of 
the brain (ventral striatum and the insulae) is correlated with 
the pleasure of getting rewards. Those studies have shown 
similar brain activity - located in the reward-processing areas 
in the mid-brain - in response to monetary rewards (receiving 
money) and the personal satisfaction derived from donating to 
charities. 150 The Oregon study confirmed those findings, which 
strongly support the notion that humans are "hard-wired to be 
altruistic.,,151 In addition to these important findings, the 
Oregon study added other interesting results. It demonstrated 
that, even if the giving is mandatory rather than voluntary, 
givers still experience a sentiment of pleasure from helping a 
good cause. Importantly, subjects who gained some degree of 
pleasure were later more willing to donate - voluntarily - to 
.48 Dacher Keltner, The Compassionate Instinct, in THE COMPASSIONATE 
INSTINCT: THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN GoODNESS 8, 10 (Dacher Keltner, Jeremy Adam 
Smith, & Jason Marsh eds., 2010); see also Ernst Fehr et aI., Neuroeconomic 
Foundations of Trust and Social Preferences: Initial Evidence, 95(2) AM. ECON. REV. 
346 (2005) (reporting neurological evidence that reciprocated acts of cooperation 
generate pleasure). See generally THE SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY (Jean 
Decety & William Ickes eds., 2009). 
1<9 William T. Harbaugh, Ulrich Mayr & Daniel Burghart, Neural Responses to 
Taxation and Voluntary Giving Reveal Motives for Charitable Donations, SCIENCE, 
June 15,2007. 
'60 Id. at 1622 (reporting that "other studies have shown that activity in the 
ventral striatum and the insulae is correlated with more abstract rewards, including .. 
. voluntary contributions to charities" and referring to the following studies: (1) J. Moll 
et al., Human Fronto-Mesoh"mbic Networks Guide Decisions About Charitable 
Donation, PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S., Oct. 17, 2006, at 15623; and (2) D. Tankersley, 
C. J. Stowe & S.A. Huettel, Altruism Is Associated with an Increased Neural Response 
to Agency, 10 NAT. NEUROSCI. 150-51 (2007) . 
••• See Nicholas D. Kristof, Our Basic Human Pleasures: Food, Sex and Giving, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.coml20 10/0 1I17/opinionll7kristof.html. 
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the food bank. This part of the Oregon study suggests that 
altruistic giving is indeed motivated by the anticipation of 
pleasure. It also may suggest a form of rational 
decisionmaking: indeed, the Oregon experiment was later 
described as demonstrating that "the neural basis of charitable 
giving decisions is consistent with a rational choice model 
where people make their giving decisions by comparing the 
utility they get from spending money on themselves with the 
utility they get from seeing the charity have more resources to 
devote to the public good.,,152 As psychologist Ulrich Mayr has 
said: 
The most surpnsmg result is that these basic pleasure 
centers in the brain don't respond only to what's good for 
yourself. They also seem to be tracking what's good for other 
people, and this occurs even when the subjects don't have a 
. hth 153 say m w a appens. 
Beyond the evidence coming from the brain, there is 
growing evidence that empathy-induced altruism can 
contribute to the altruists' psychological and even physical 
health. One survey of over 1,700 women involved regularly in 
helping others, for example, has shown that these women 
reported "feeling a 'high' while helping - a sense of stimulation, 
warmth, and increased energy - and a 'calm' afterward - a 
sense of relaxation, freedom from stress, and enhanced self-
worth.,,154 Other studies further suggested that empathy-
induced altruism may bring physical changes in heart rate and 
blood pressure and, according to one researcher, may even 
reduce the risk of heart disease. All in all, then, it is not 
surprising that researchers of different disciplines have 
152 Ulrich Mayr, William T. Harbaugh, & Dharol Tankersley, Neuroeconomics of 
Charitable Giving and Philanthropy, in NEUROECONOMICS: DECISION MAKING AND THE 
BRAIN 303, 311 (Paul W. Glimcher, Colin Camerer, Russell Ernst Fehr & Alan Poldrack 
eds., 2008). I thank Professsor Mayr for his generous assistance with regard to the 
challenging experience of engaging in interdisciplinary work and knowledge for non-
legal complex disciplines. This difficulty is inherent to working with the law-and-the-
emotions perspective. It is especially severe while doing the (second dimension) work 
of "investigation," i.e., the effort to gain much non-legal knowledge about the relevant 
emotion/so 
153 John Tierney, Taxes a Pleasure? Check the Brain Scan, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 
2007. 
154 C. DANIEL BATSON, THE ALTRIDSM QUESTION: TOWARD A SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANSWER 222 (1991). 
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developed a growing belief that doing good for others may do 
good for the altruist.155 
3. "The Hedonistic Paradox" 
The recent evidence that the very act of giving produces 
pleasure may revive what is sometimes called "the hedonistic 
paradox":156 the idea that a psychic or affective "reward" 
experienced by the giver renders the act of giving an egoistic 
one. In one sense, the question of whether the rewards gained 
by expressing empathy disqualify the behavior from being 
purely altruistic is not relevant to the legal-enforcement 
debate. Indeed, the presence of reward could make it easier to 
argue that promises of gifts are simply supported by 
consideration (i.e., the promisor's pleasure) and therefore are 
eligible for enforcement. 
On the other hand, seeing the pleasure as comparable to 
monetary consideration may reinforce Eisenberg's argument 
that the "world of gift" may be threatened by the application of 
bargaining-like discourse. To deal with such concern it is 
important to separate the rewarding pleasure from the core 
motivation for acting. Although the pleasure of giving creates 
brain activity akin to that produced by the gain of monetary 
rewards, it does not follow that gifts lose their noble traits. 
Despite the pleasure it produces, the gift may still be motivated 
155 Id. at 222-23. 
156 SERGE-CHRISTOPHE KOLM & JEAN MERCIER YTIDER, THE HANDBOOK OF THE 
ECONOMICS OF GIVING, ALTRUISM AND RECIPROCITY: FOUNDATIONS 134-35 (2006) 
(discussing the "so called hedonistic paradox" as follows: "if a person is motivated to 
increase another's welfare, he is pleased to attain this desired goal and therefore his 
apparent altruism can also be seen as a product of egoism."); C. Daniel Batson, 
Altruism and Pro-Social Behavior, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 282-316 
(Gilbert ed., 1998); see also C. Daniel Batson, Empathy-Induced Altruistic Motivation 
(2008), available at 
http://portal.idc.ac.il/eniSymposium/HerzliyaSymposium/DocumentsldcBatson.pdf 
(explaining the paradox: "The argument goes as follows: Even if it were possible for a 
person to have another's welfare as an ultimate goal, such a person would be interested 
in attaining this goal and would experience pleasure on doing so; therefore, even this 
apparent altruism would actually be a product of egoism."). A more popular expression 
of the paradox was reported recently by the New York Times when Brian Mullaney, co-
founder of Smile Train, which helps tens of thousands of children each year who are 
born with cleft lips and cleft palates, was quoted saying: "The most selfish thing you 
can do is to help other people." See Nicholas D. Kristof, Our Basic Human Pleasures: 
Food, Sex and Giving, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 16, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.coml2010/0 1I17/0pinionil7kristof.html. 
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by a non-selfish goal that is triggered by feelings of empathy; in 
that way the special spirit of the gift does not have to be 
submerged by the logic ofbargains. '57 
The hedonistic paradox is therefore resolvable when we go 
beyond the benefit of the promisor, to take account of her 
intentions and human will. To avoid losing the spirit of the 
gift, as an act that reflects human care, the question should not 
simply be "was there a benefit to the promisor?" but also "in 
what way did the promisor gain such benefit?" If a promisor 
was mainly focused on her own interests, such as earning social 
respect, then the act is not altruistic and we have enough 
"regular" consideration to enforce the promise. On the other 
hand, if the promisor was focused on making another person 
better, then her pleasure from accomplishing that goal should 
not interrupt the moral and personal value of her giving. 
Recognizing the pleasure inherent in gIvrng, without 
surrendering to the hedonic paradox, makes other-oriented 
promising an activity that bears important similarities to 
material exchanges yet is not detached from its altruistic roots. 
E. GRATITUDE AND "AFFECTIVE CONSIDERATION" 
The pleasure of the giving promisor may not be enough to 
justify enforceability, as it shows a benefit that is not 
necessarily connected to dynamics of exchange. The traditional 
bargaining theory leads to the exclusion of donative promises 
because it perceives the process as a one-sided, voluntary flow 
of benefits that occurs without reference to the recipient's 
response. 158 Careful attention to the emotions involved, 
however, can tell a different and more reciprocal story. 
157 An interesting explanation for the inclination to see a conflict between gifts 
and pleasure can be seen in the puritan Christian tradition that expects people to give 
selflessly. However, many believe today that it is inaccurate to conclude that helping 
another and feeling good about oneself are incompatible. See C. R. SNYDER & SHANE J. 
LoPEZ, POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: THE SCIENTIFIC AND PRACTICAL EXPLORATIONS OF 
HUMAN STRENGTHS 270 (2006); COLIN GRANT, ALTRUISM AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS 77-79 
(2000). 
158 Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155, 156 (1989) (arguing 
as follows: "[G)ifts are treated as one-sided transfers which merely redistribute existing 
wealth, and they thus are not thought to warrant legal enforcement unless their 
formality renders administration of them simple. Bargains, on the other hand, are 
considered two-sided exchanges which create wealth, and due to their substantive 
importance they are thought to warrant enforcement without formality.") (emphasis 
added). 
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The emotions that motivate the promising of gifts are 
seldom unreciprocated. And yet this reciprocity does not mean 
"bargaining" but rather is an affective reciprocity. An 
expression of empathy and compassion - as in the case of 
promising a gift - elicits many emotions in the recipient, most 
notably a strong sentiment of gratitude. The word gratitude 
comes from gratia (favor) and gratus (pleasure) in Latin; its 
roots connect it to ideas of "kindness, generousness, gifts, the 
beauty of giving and receiving, or getting something for 
nothing.,,159 The engagement with gratuitous promises has 
therefore tight linguistic ties with the dynamics of gratitude. 
Accordingly, any investigation of these promises can benefit 
from learning more about the way gratitude operates. 
As an emotion, gratitude had until recently been 
understudied and almost neglected, a fact that is often 
explained by the difference between gratitude and some 
accepted basic emotions such as fear, anger or even 
happiness. 160 Hume, for example, defined gratitude as a "calm 
passion," as it seldom bursts or gushes, as do the more ''basic'' 
emotions. 161 Recent studies of gratitude have classified 
gratitude as a higher-level moral emotion that involves both 
social and cognitive processes. 162 Moreover, some emotion 
theorists have connected each emotion with a distinct 
"dramatic plot" or "core relational theme.,,163 In such theories 
the "plot" of gratitude is highly reciprocal: it is triggered when 
one person gives something that promotes the well-being of 
another, who in return becomes grateful and is motivated to 
express her gratitude, whether in words or by another act of 
giving. When gratitude produces counter-gifting, the work of 
the renowned anthropologist Marcel Mauss, whose words 
159 Robert A. Emmons, The Psychology of Gratitude: An Introduction, in THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF GRATITUDE 4 (Robert A. Emmons & Michael E. McCullough eds., 
2004) (quoting P. W. PRUYSER, THE MINISTER AS DIAGNOSTICIAN 69 (1976». 
160 Robert C. Solomon, Foreword, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GRATITUDE at v-vi; 
Emmons, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GRATITUDE at 3-4. 
161 Robert C. Solomon, Foreword, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GRATITUDE at vi. 
162 Ross Buck, The Gratitude of Exchange and the Gratitude of Caring: A 
Developmental-Interactionist Perspective of Moral Emotion, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
GRATITUDE at 10l. 
163 Michael E. McCullough & Jo-Ann Tsang, Parent of the Virtues? The Prosocial 
Contours of Gratitude, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GRATITUDE at 124 (explaining the 
theory and referring to R. S. LAzARUS & B. N. LAzARUS, PASSION AND REASON: MAKING 
SENSE OF OUR EMOTIONS (1994». 
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opened this Article, comes to mind. 164 Mauss suggested that 
the whole idea of a free gift is based on a misunderstanding, 
and in fact many societies can be described as based on a 
system of reciprocal gift-exchange. 165 Such a system is 
comparable to the now more acknowledged system of market-
exchange and, remarkably, Mauss has even argued that gift 
exchanges are "the archaic forms ofcontract."166 
While direct application of Mauss's exchange arguments 
can offer support to the idea of enforcing donative promises,167 
it also triggers the fear of too commercialized a view of gifts, a 
fear which has been used as an argument against 
enforcement.16B Paying special attention to the reciprocity of 
the emotions that motivate gifting behavior, rather than to the 
reciprocity of the behavior itself, may be valuable in coping 
with this concern. It associates such promises with reciprocity, 
without undermining their distinctive non-market character. 
For this reason, it is important to note that gratitude is not 
simply an automatic response to receiving a benefit from 
another; the dynamics of exchange here depend on the 
existence of specific affective features, mainly the right 
intentions. Adam Smith may have been the first to argue that, 
in order to feel and express gratitude, people must believe that 
their benefactors intended to benefit them. 169 This approach 
tightly connects gratitude with empathy and creates "an 
economy of gratitude," where gratitude is taken as a known 
and expected response to an expression of empathy. 
The last idea is especially relevant to the unenforceability 
164 For a thorough discussion of the principal of reciprocity and Mauss's work, see 
Serge-Christophe Kolm, Reciprocity: Its Scope, Rationales, and Consequences, in 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF GIVING, RECIPROCITY AND ALTRUISM FOUNDATIONS 
VOLUME 1, 371 (Serge-Christophe Kolm & Jean Mercier Ythier eds., 2006), available at 
http://www.sciencedirect.com. 
165 Mary Douglas, Foreword: No Free Gifts, in MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: THE 
FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES xii to xviii (W.D. Halls trans., 
W. W. Norton & Co. 2000) (1950). 
166 MAuSS, supra note 2, at 5. 
167 Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155, 194-95 (1989) 
(relying on Mauss's exchange analysis to justify the enforcement of gratuitous 
promises). 
168 Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 841-44 (responding to Baron's reliance on Mauss's 
arguments). 
169 Michael E. McCullough & Jo-Ann Tsang, Parent of the Virtues? The Prosocial 
Contours of Gratitude, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GRATITUDE 124 (Robert A. Emmons & 
Michael E. McCullough eds., 2004). 
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discussion since contractual promises to give gifts are by 
nature a result of an intended effort, evidenced by the fact that 
the promisor has articulated and sometimes has written a clear 
promise to benefit the promisee. Consequently, those promises 
can be understood, as Smith suggests, as part of the economy of 
gratitude in which the donative promise, as an empathic act of 
the promisor, is reciprocated by the promisee's feelings of 
gratitude. Furthermore, under the same "economic" logic, 
gratitude is not only a typical response to empathy, but a 
reaction which is expected by society. And yet, despite the use 
of a "cost-benefit" logic, the economy of gratitude is different 
from the economy of goods ("a bargain"), as it is based on good 
will and social care rather than on utility analysis. Therefore, 
in recognizing the affective reciprocity that is elicited by 
donative promises, it is possible to see their parallel to 
bargained-for promises without damaging the uniqueness of 
the affective domain.170 
Furthermore, the plot of gratitude tends to perpetuate 
empathic affects which in turn motivate more gifting behavior 
and additional gratitude, creating a cycle of empathy and 
gratitude. Such circularity lends gratitude both its individual 
value and its pro-social importance and, as we shall see, it 
offers a new normative reason for the enforcement of donative 
• 171 promIses. 
However, notwithstanding their harmonious value, the 
cycles of empathy and gratitude also expose the fact that, as 
with bargained-for promises, donative promises may also entail 
a burden on the promisee. Even though the burden is not 
material, but rather affective, it still may be seen as 
detrimental for the recipient. Indeed, socio-psychological 
studies show that some people associate gratitude with 
dependency and even some degree of humiliation, as the 
emotion suggests they cannot be totally autonomous and self-
sufficient. Interestingly, those studies also show that such a 
170 See Baron, supra note 167, at 194 (maintaining that "[flor non-lawyers gifts 
are exchanges"). 
171 See infra Part III (arguing that to individuals gratitude contributes mental 
and physical progress that in turn allows grateful people to give even more and by that 
to invite more empathy, and discussing the social value of the empathy-gratitude 
"chain of reciprocity"); see also Aafke Elisabeth Komter, Gratitude and Gift Exchange, 
in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GRATITUDE 195 (Robert A. Emmons & Michael E. McCullough 
eds., 2004). 
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view of gratitude is culturally contingent. Apparently, the level 
of tendency to admit, express, or even to discuss gratitude 
varies from one culture to another and is especially low in 
cultures where capitalistic and individualistic ideas prevail. 
For example, studies have found that, when compared to other 
societies, Americans and especially American men reported 
much more discomfort with regard to feeling and showing 
gratitude and tended to view the experience of gratitude as 
unpleasant and even humiliating. 172 As Robert Solomon 
explained: "Gratitude presupposes so many judgments about 
debt and dependency that it is easy to see why supposedly self-
reliant American males would feel queasy about even 
discussing it.,,173 This uneasiness with gratitude was nicely 
captured in a scene from The Simpsons, in which Bart Simpson 
refuses to say grace at the family dinner table and instead 
sends out a self-reliant message, saying, "Dear God, we paid for 
all this stuff ourselves, so thanks for nothing.,,174 
The view of gratitude as a possible burden inflicted on the 
recipient by the giver's expression of empathy is not new and 
can be traced back to Aristotle. 175 Later, in the nineteenth 
century, Ralph Waldo Emerson made a similar point with 
regard to law and gifts, emphasizing the cost of gratitude by 
saying, "The law of benefits is a difficult channel. ... It is not 
the office of a man to receive gifts. How dare you give them? 
We wish to be self-sustained."176 Emerson's words suggest that 
172 See s. Sommers & c. Kosmitzki, Emotion and Social Context: An American-
German Comparison, 27(1) BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 35-49 (1988) (comparing Americans 
to Germans and Israelis). There is also some empirical evidence that gratitude is 
associated with feminine gender-role stereotypic traits. In the above study, for 
example, not even one woman said that it was difficult for her to openly express 
gratitude. See also Leslie R. Brody, On Understanding Gender DiJrerences in the 
Expression of Emotion, in HUMAN FEELINGS: EXPLORATIONS IN AFFECT DEVELOPMENT 
AND MEANING 87 (S. Ablon et al. eds., 1993). 
173 Robert Solomon, The Cross Cultural Comparison of Emotion, in EMOTIONS IN 
AsIAN THOUGHT: A DIALOGUE IN COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY 282 (J. Marks & R. Ames 
eds., 1995). 
174 ROBERT EMMONS, THANKS! How THE NEW SCIENCE OF GRATITUDE CAN MAKE 
YOU HAPPIER 8 (2007). 
175 Emmons, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GRATITUDE at 8 (discussing Aristotle's 
reasoning for not including gratitude among the virtues. According to Aristotle, 
magnanimous people "insist on their self-sufficiency and therefore find it demeaning to 
be indebted and thus grateful to others"). 
176 EMMONS, supra note 174, at 130. The full text of Emerson's essay is available 
at http://www.blupete.com/Literature/EssayslBesUEmersonGifts.htm (last visited Mar. 
31,2010). 
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gratuitous promises may be seen as creating affective 
consideration not by producing affective benefit to the promisor 
but by generating an "affective detriment" to the promisee. 
Such detriment is grounded in the emotions, but it is 
structurally similar to the detriment that normally satisfies the 
consideration requirement and allows enforceability. 
The fact that gratefulness does not enrich the promisor of a 
donative promise or that feelings of gratitude are actually 
positive and healthy does not necessarily conflict with finding a 
detriment in making someone obliged to feel gratitude. 
Revisiting the infamous case of Hamer v. Sidway can further 
clarify the point.177 In this case an uncle promised a gift to his 
nephew: $5,000 to be given to the nephew after he attained 
age twenty-one, if he would refrain from smoking, drinking and 
playing cards or billiards for money.178 The lower court found 
no consideration and refused enforcement, classifying the 
uncle's promise as gratuitous. 179 According to that court, the 
uncle was not enriched by his nephew's good behavior, and as 
far as the nephew was concerned such good behavior was 
actually beneficial and not detrimental.18o On appeal, however, 
Judge Parker explained that it is much easier to satisfy the 
consideration requirement, and detriment should be broadly 
construed to include any restriction of a lawful freedom. 181 
Since the nephew had the right to smoke, giving up smoking in 
exchange for the promise of money was a detriment that 
established consideration and therefore allowed 
enforceability. 182 Applying the broad reading of "detriment" in 
Hamer v. Sidwayto our discussion makes it possible to point to 
an affective detriment when donative promises elicit counter 
gratitude. 
III. INTEGRATION: AFFECTIVE CONSIDERATION WITH INTENT 
TO BE LEGALLY BOUND 
In Part I we have seen that the classical doctrine has 
177 Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891). 
178 Hamer v. Sidway, 11 N.Y.S. 182, 182-84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1890), rev'd, 27 N.E. 
256 (N.Y. 1891). 
179 Id. at 185-86. 
180 Id. 
181 Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256, 257 (N.Y. 1891). 
182 Id. 
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adopted an unenforceability rule for donative promises due to 
their affective nature and as a way of reinforcing an association 
between law and contracts on the one hand and rational 
choices on the other. Part II then explored the primary 
emotions that operate in gift situations and their interaction. 
It will now be useful to return to law and to ask the normative 
question: should the law of contracts enforce donative 
promises? The coming analysis will review the leading 
justifications for enforcing bargained-for promises and will 
suggest that each of them is relevant to the enforcement of 
donative promises, not in spite of their distinctiveness, but 
precisely because of their affective dimensions. 
A. THE WILL THEORY AND THE POWER OF PROMISES 
According to the will theory of contract, a promise merits 
enforcement because of the expressed will of the promisor to be 
bound by it. The theory focuses on such will as "something 
inherently worthy of respect,"183 and it is informed and 
influenced by Kantian philosophy.184 The theory stems from 
the liberal notion that all human beings are autonomous moral 
agents, obliged to keep those promises they freely undertake. 
By legally compelling promisors to live up to their obligations, 
therefore, society values their contractual agency. The freedom 
to contract, meaning the basic ability of individuals to engage 
themselves in contractual relationships and receive the support 
of law through contractual enforcement, is therefore of utmost 
importance under this approach.18s Promises that are made 
intentionally are central to will theories: the very act of 
articulating a promise is taken as an extension of the human 
will that triggered it as well as an expression of a free choice 
that was made; both giving the promise the highest moral 
status. To the individual value of enforcing promises, "will 
theorists" add a social dimension. From their point of view, 
keeping promises is the key to the ability of humans to trust 
each other, which makes promises a vital foundation of a 
healthy society and further justifies investing social resources 
183 Morris Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARv. L. REV. 553, 575 (1933). 
184 DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT: TOWARDS A LIBERAL THEORY OF 
CONTRACT 9-11 (2003). 
185 Hila Keren, "We Insist! Freedom Now"; Does Contract Doctrine Have 
Anything Constitutional To Say! 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 133, 172 (2005). 
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in their enforcement. ls6 
From this perspective, the free choice of a donor to express 
her empathy and care for another via a promise to give a gift 
should mean that she is no longer free to break that promise. 
This is particularly true in the many cases in which promisors 
have made palpable efforts to be legally bound by their 
promises. Efforts such as writing down the promise, framing it 
in legal language, and especially taking pains to try to 
nominally satisfy the consideration requirement in order to win 
enforceability (the "peppercorn" practice)IS7 all suggest 
increasing degrees of a will to be legally bound and an 
intention to create an enforceable promise. 
The current regime of unenforceability of donative 
promises has been linked to a view of those promises as 
expressing a will that is "damaged" or "unreaL" This view 
derives from the assumption that the gift situation reflects a 
severely imbalanced exchange (the promisor being seen as 
"giving something for nothing"), one that probably was not 
rationally and freely chosen. Meaningfully, under a true 
understanding of the will theory, no similar reservation exists 
with regard to business promises. ISS The research into empathy 
and altruistic behavior discussed above challenges the legal 
assumption that there is something wrong with the will to give 
gifts. The significant nonmonetary rewards that flow from 
giving - such as the pleasure that is evidenced by specific brain 
activity in the giver, or the gratitude of the recipient - frame 
the choice to give as a natural and very common form of human 
will, and leave no reason to suspect the intentions of generous 
promisors. 
Consequently, from the will-theory perspective, a refusal to 
enforce donative promises severely limits people's freedom to 
186 CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION 13 (1981). 
187 Joseph Siprut, The Peppercorn Reconsidered: My a Promise To Sell 
Blackacre for Nominal Consideration Is Not Binding, but Should Be, 97 Nw. V.L. REV. 
1809, 1810 (2003) (showing that "under existing law, promisors are powerless to make 
a binding gratuitous promise no matter how strong the desire or how clear the 
intention" and arguing for a reform). 
188 See Eyal Zamir, The Missing Interest: Restoration of the Contractual 
Equivalence, 93 VA. L. REV. 59, 104 (2007). According to the will theory, the 
contractual liability stems from the intrinsic moral force of the promise regardless of 
its content, and the adequacy of the exchange (like many other utilitarian and 
consequential matters) should not matter. 
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contract, disrespects their autonomy, and in the long run 
endangers the status of promises altogether. As argued by the 
eminent American "will theorist" Professor Charles Fried, "If 
we decline to take seriously [the obligatory power of the 
promise] . .. to that extent we do not take [the promisor] 
. I ,,189 serIous y as a person. 
B. CONSEQUENTIALIST CONSIDERATIONS 
Consequentialist views (including economic-efficiency 
analysis) suggest that bargained-for promises deserve 
enforcement because they advance the well-being of both 
promisor and promisee, and therefore in the aggregate 
contribute to society as a whole. A bargained-for promise is 
considered to be socially "productive," or to be an efficient way 
to achieve wealth-maximization.190 
From this perspective, the unenforceability rule of 
donative promises may arise from the assumption that they are 
- from a utilitarian point of view - "sterile," "nude," or non-
productive. The idea was bluntly expressed by Professor 
Fuller, who wrote: 
While an exchange of goods is a transaction which conduces 
to the production of wealth and the division oflabor, a gift is 
... a "sterile transmission."l9l 
However, the economic focus on wealth-maximization is 
only one way of evaluating the consequences of a certain rule. 
Other, broader consequentialist theories are possible. A 
consequentialist moral theory requires the promotion of 
favorable outcomes and entails a choice between different legal 
rules according to the goodness of their resulting states of 
affairs. But a consequentialist framework is not committed to 
any particular theory of the good. It can encompass anything 
that would improve individual or social outcomes including 
"desires, ... beliefs, emotions, ... the climate, and everything 
189 FRIED, supra note 186, at 20-2l. 
190 This kind of analysis assumes the rationality of human beings and their 
ability to engage in self-interested cost-benefit analysis to maximize their own wealth. 
191 Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799,815 (1941); see 
also ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 52 (3d ed. 1998) (arguing that "[g]ifts are not 
necessarily productive"). 
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else.,,192 For instance, one may claim that the appropriate 
criterion of well-being is a favorable mental state, rather than 
the maximization of wealth or the satisfaction of selfish 
preferences. A famous example of such a possibility is Jeremy 
Bentham's utilitarian conception of welfare, which equates 
well-being with happiness. 193 
Any consequentialist approach that is broader than the 
efficiency theory associated with traditional forms of law and 
economics would give significant weight to affectively related 
outcomes of enforcing promises to give giftS. 194 Indeed, some 
outcomes are desirable even from the narrow perspective of law 
and economics, although they have not led to a normative call 
for enforcement. Writing about the issue at hand, Richard 
Posner, for example, explained that the value of a donative 
promise to both the promisor and the promisee is higher under 
an enforceability regime, where the keeping of the promise 
enjoys higher probability.195 Similarly, Professor Eisenberg 
admits that, counter to conventional belief, donative promises 
have some redistributional outcomes that may enhance 
t 'l't 196 u 11 y. 
Applying law-and-the-emotions perspective to the 
consequentialist analysis can offer a greater awareness of those 
outcomes that concern the atrective aspects of our well-being. 
These outcomes arise from the individual and social value of 
positive emotions in general, and particularly from the 
emotions of empathy and gratitude, which dominate the gift 
domain. In his famous lecture "Rational Fools," economist and 
philosopher Amartya Sen argued that we cannot normatively 
evaluate an act or a rule "without mentioning the sympathetic 
192 DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 25 (1984) (emphasis added). 
193 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 11-12 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Anthlone Press 1970) (1780). 
194 See Prentice, supra note 7, at 881 (a recent broad approach coming from 
within law and economics, namely from the emerging "behavioral law and economics"). 
195 Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 411, 412 (1977) (arguing and explaining how making a donative promise has the 
effect of "increasing the present value of an uncertain future stream of transfer 
payments"). 
196 Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 828-29. Eisenberg argues, however, that such 
utilitarian value is offset by the possibility that enforcement will decrease the amount 
of gifts. Id. For an illuminating analysis of the utilitarian value of redistributional 
voluntary transfers, see Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of Redistribution 
Through Private Law, 91 MINN. L. REV. 326 (2006). 
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concern people have for the good of others, as a factor 
independent of their concern for their own satisfactions.,,197 A 
law that supports and validates expressions of "sympathetic 
concern" is, from this consequentialist perspective, a proper 
law because it promotes the well-being of the promisor (the 
giver). This promotion of well-being occurs when the law 
respects the promisor's choice to have less money and more 
satisfaction of her concern for others. The same logic of 
enforcing a bargained-for promise is useful here too: the 
voluntary promise to transfer wealth should be taken as 
evidence of the promisor's set of preferences, where preferences 
- according to utilitarian theories - should be followed because 
they represent the best available way to enhance the welfare of 
the promisor (and thus of society at large). 
Under an inclusive definition of goodness, there are a place 
and a need to take into account all the valuable influences of 
feeling empathy and acting altruistically. As we have seen in 
the previous Part, feeling and expressing empathy are highly 
rewarding from the perspective of the promisor, who may 
experience everything from pleasure to better health, better 
self-image, more social respect and less anxiety. Indeed, such 
an abundance of rewards creates incentives to engage in 
empathy-induced altruism, and supporting such altruism by 
legal enforcement facilitates more positive outcomes of the 
same sort. 
Beyond these individual gains, the relationship between 
empathy and altruistic behavior (Batson's hypothesis) can also 
enhance collective well-being. The pro-social acts that arise 
from feeling and expressing empathy have an immense 
potential for improving society at large. For this reason, for 
example, scientists and psychologists have recently directed 
growing efforts to the project of cultivating empathy in children 
and adults. 198 
We have discussed above the fact that empathy often 
elicits gratitude in a self-reinforcing cycle. If we are concerned 
about social outcomes, there is a clear benefit in offering legal 
197 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF 
EMOTIONS 391 (2001). 
198 DACHER KELTNER, The Compassionate Instinct, in THE COMPASSIONATE 
INSTINCT: THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN GOODNESS 14-15 (Dacher Keltner, Jeremy Adam 
Smith, & Jason Marsh eds., 2010); C. DANIEL BATSON, THE ALTRUISM QUESTION: 
TOWARD A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ANSWER 224-29 (1991). 
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support to a process of gift-promising that not only expresses 
empathy but also fosters feelings of gratitude. On the 
individualistic level gratitude permits the grateful to 
"experience a variety of measurable benefits: psychological, 
physical and social," 199 sometimes to a point that it "can 
measurably change people's lives.,,200 In addition, research 
demonstrates that gratitude has an extremely beneficial social 
role. In the words of one scholar, "its sociological importance 
can hardly be overestimated" and without it society would 
break apart.201 Gratitude, which forms a critical link between 
receiving and giving, moves recipients to share and increase 
what they have received. It thereby serves as "a pivotal 
concept for our social interactions."202 Grateful people engage 
in more supportive, kind, and helpful behaviors (e.g., loaning 
money and providing compassion, sympathy, and emotional 
support) than do their less-grateful peers. 203 As individuals and 
as a society, therefore, we enhance human well-being by 
supporting gratitude. 
Even more generally, empathy, as a positive emotion, is 
directly connected to personal growth. Positive emotions, 
argue contemporary psychologists and theorists of emotion, 
"widen the array of thoughts and actions that come to mind" 
(the broadening effect) and then develop people's enduring 
personal resources (the building effect). 204 Therefore, under 
almost any consequentialist approach, society gains by 
nurturing the positive emotions in general and empathy in 
particular. 
13. 
As psychologist Barbara Fredrickson emphasized: 
Positive emotions also produce flourishing. Moreover, they 
do so not simply within the present, pleasant moment but 
over the long term as well. The take-home message is that 
199 Robert A. Emmons, Pay It Forward, THE GREATER GOOD, Summer 2007, at 12-
200 Id. at 13. 
201 Georg Simmel, Faithfulness and Gratitude, in Kurt H. Wolff, THE SOCIOLOGY 
OF GEORG SIMMEL (Free Press, 1950), at 387. 
202 Robert A. Emmons, Pay It Forward, in THE COMPASSIONATE INSTINCT: THE 
SCIENCE OF HUMAN GoODNESS 77-85 (Dacher Keltner, Jeremy Adam Smith, & Jason 
Marsh eds., 2010). 
203 Emmons, supra note 199, at 14. 
204 Barbara L. Fredrickson, Positive Emotions, in THE HANDBOOK OF POSITIVE 
PSYCHOLOGY 120, 125 (C. R. Snyder & Shane J. Lopez eds., 2002). 
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positive emotions are worth cultivating, not just as end 
states in themselves but also as a means to achieving 
psychological growth and improved well-being over time.205 
For consequentialists, then, the contribution of positive 
emotions such as empathy to personal well-being and social 
welfare should make an enforceability rule more appealing 
than the current unenforceability.206 
C. FAIRNESS 
The discussion above also points to a fairness concern that 
supports enforceability. In the debate over the question of 
donative promises, it is common to argue that the 
unenforceability principle does not usually damage the 
promisee and therefore enforceability is not justified.207 If any 
damage was caused, it is further argued, enforcement will 
follow not from the mere breaking of the promise but from the 
protection granted to promisees in cases of justified reliance. 
As clarified in the well-known case of Ricketts v. Scothorn, for 
example, promises that are relied upon by the donee to her 
detriment will be enforced on that ground, even though 
consideration is lacking, under the promissory-estoppel 
doctrine. 208 
Despite this ostensibly comforting consensus, the 
knowledge about gratitude as an immediate and unavoidable 
response to empathetic giving exposes a possible problem not 
covered by the conventional protection of reliance. The 
problem arises from the immediate and unavoidable traits of 
gratitude. Only a potential recipient who rejects the gift is 
immune from feelings of gratitude, and indeed for the most 
part a reluctance to experience gratitude - with all its 
meanings - is the primary reason for rejecting a gift in the first 
place. Conversely, recipients who have not rejected the gift will 
205 Barbara L. Fredrickson, The Role of Positive Emotions in Positive Psychology, 
56(3) AM. PSYCHOL. 218, (2001). 
206 Chris Hann, The Gift and Reciprocity: Perspectives trom Economic 
Anthropology, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF GIVING, RECIPROCITY AND 
ALTRUISM FOUNDATIONS VOLUME 1, 207-23 (Serge-Christophe Kolm & Jean Mercier 
Ythier eds., 2006). 
201 Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 822; MARVIN A. CmRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE 
ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACT 20-21 (2006). 
208 Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898). 
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almost inevitably feel gratitude and often express it. In such 
cases the promisee's sense of gratitude can be seen as an act of 
special reliance. If later on the promise is broken, this 
gratitude cannot be taken back, and it becomes an affective 
cost suffered by the promisee. Admittedly, in the atypical case 
in which the original promisor is the one who reneges, the 
problem may be of modest scope, as the feelings of 
disappointment or even anger of the promisee may balance the 
gratitude earlier "given." And yet, in most cases it is not the 
original promisor who experiences a change of mind. As 
mentioned earlier, the common case is one in which the 
promisor is no longer alive and the promise is broken by 
relatives who are interested in the promised gift for 
themselves. This situation creates an irreversible harm in the 
promisee, as the fundamental affective exchange (empathy for 
gratitude) has already happened: the original promisor took 
with her the gratitude and all it may generate - from loyalty to 
care and love - and the disappointed promisee is impoverished 
without compensation for what may be seen as "affective 
reliance." 
In this situation, fairness concerns call for protecting the 
grateful promisee. The law can best do this by acknowledging 
the importance of gratitude, categorizing it either as an 
affective detriment suffered by the promisee or as an affective 
reliance on her part. Either way, enforceability seems a more 
appropriate legal response. 
D. THE RISK OF "COMMODIFICATION" 
A final argument, framed by Professor Eisenberg, is that 
enforcement would have the effect of "commodifying the gift 
relationship.,,209 As Eisenberg210 and others211 have 
acknowledged, this argument is at least rhetorically different 
from other objections to enforcement. It attempts to deny legal 
enforcement not because of the inferiority of gifts, but due to 
their supposed superiority. 
Eisenberg's "commodification" argument is actually made 
209 Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 848. 
210 Id. at 849. 
211 Mark B. Wessman, Recent Defenses of Consideration: Commodification and 
Collaboration, 41 IND. L. REV. 9 (2008). 
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out of two arguments: the first is the presumption that legal 
enforcement means commodification, and the second is the 
contention that commodification is a negative process 
(impoverishing). Both sub-arguments are tightly connected by 
Eisenberg himself to the evaluation of a prospective encounter 
between law and emotions - a moment about which Eisenberg 
is fairly pessimistic. His approach therefore invites a response 
that would be especially attentive to the interrelation of law 
and the emotions in this context of gifts. 
With regard to the presumption that enforcement means 
commodification, it should be noted from the outset that 
Eisenberg's is an uncommon use of the notion. At the very 
minimum it requires more explanation than has so far been 
offered: in what way does enforcing a promise transform the 
promise into a commodity? 
The term "commodification" is usually used to describe a 
process of placing a price tag on something that did not have a 
price before or that is not usually associated with commercial 
trade. The concept is, of course, deeply connected to the idea of 
the market, where things are being bought and sold, and to the 
belief that some things "are not for sale.,,212 In the 
commodification literature the concept of "contested 
commodities" is reserved for a long list of "things" - such as 
babies, women, body organs, sex, care, and so on - that 
"challenge us to try to understand the appropriate scope of the 
market.,,213 Conceptualizing such things as commodities creates 
some degree of discomfort as "we experience personal and 
social conflict about the process and the result.,,214 
However, this common meaning of commodification is not 
really relevant to the current enforceability debate, which 
makes the use of the term "commodification" in this context 
212 Martha Ertman & Joan Williams, Preface: Freedom, Equality and the Many 
Futures of Commodification, in RETIllNKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS 
IN LAw AND CULTURE 1 (Martha Ertman & Joan Williams eds., 2005). 
213 Margaret Jane Radin, Contested Commodities, in RETlflNKING 
COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAw AND CULTURE 81 (Martha Ertman & 
Joan Williams eds., 2005); see also Michele Goodwin, The Body Market: Race Politics & 
Private Ordering, 49 ARIz. L. REV. 599 (2007), which argues that social justice can be 
better achieved through regulated markets for organs, ova, and even hair. In the 
absence of regulated markets, black markets and coercive, fraudulent secondary 
regimes will develop (and have developed) alongside altruistic procurement strategies; 
these are more oppressive than their regulated counterparts. 
214 Radin, supra note 213, at 81. 
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problematic. Most donative promises already come with a price 
tag attached. Indeed, in most of the cases the litigation in 
courts has involved donative promises to transfer particular 
sums of money and/or assets that have a well-defined and not-
contested market value. Moreover, with respect to many 
contested commodities, the legal approach is to allow - and 
even encourage - free and donative transfers precisely out of 
anti-commodification motives. Supporting donations ("gifts") is 
thus the main legal way of resisting commodificaton and 
preventing recourse to the market. Primary examples can be 
found in legal regulation of organ donations combined with 
prohibition of their sale, as well as in allowing surrogacy 
agreements but barring payment to the surrogate mothers.215 
Donative promises are, by definition, different from 
commercial exchange - they are not aimed at selling and 
buying, and their entire separate existence depends on 
recognizing that fact. 216 It is hard therefore to see what can be 
the contested commodity or the subject of commodification in 
the case of such promises. 
The last point is not only semantic, as rhetoric can be 
powerfully misleading. The use of the term "commodification" 
in such an idiosyncratic manner is far from a neutral phrasing. 
It has the power of educing strong anti-commodification 
sentiments, normally reserved for the most challenging 
dilemmas, such as the sale of babies, and directing them at 
another context without any clear justification. The remainder 
of this discussion will consequently refrain from using this 
loaded term. 
The risk ascribed by Eisenberg to legal enforcement is 
more connected to a concern about applying legal norms to 
215 See, e.g., Peter Halewood, On Commodification and Self-Ownership, 20 YALE 
J.L. & HUMAN 131, 133 (2008) (citing Richard Titmuss's classic work, THE GIFT 
RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY (1971) as offering "the essential 
anti-commodification thesis that body products ought to be allocated by gift or donation 
only, not through sale, because market exchanges of these products would commodifY 
human beings in ways incompatible with human dignity."); Commodification and 
Women~ Household Labor, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION, at 299-300 (critiquing 
from a feminist perspective, the conventional separation between allowed gifts and 
forbidden sales in the context of surrogacy). 
216 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Unpacking the Gift: flliquid Goods and 
Empathetic Dialogue, in THE QUESTION OF THE GIFT: ESSAYS ACROSS DISCIPLINES 85, 
93-94 (Mark Osteen ed., 2002) (arguing that gift-giving differs from market exchange 
because, through gifts, each party engages in "imaginative participation in the life of 
the other," helping to cement relationships). 
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spheres that are considered to be remote from law because of 
their relational, intimate and affective profile. Since contract 
law is traditionally connected with the market, this worry is 
also linked to the fear of blurring the lines between market and 
non-market domains.217 This fear is described by Eisenberg as 
the fear of impoverishing the non-legal world of gifts as a result 
of contaminating it with legal and market-born ideas.218 
It is not clear what the grounds for Eisenberg's 
contamination concerns are, since he does not offer any 
example of similar processes where the touch of law has 
destroyed non-legal dynamics. This is not a marginal point 
because, as mentioned earlier, there are many other Western 
legal systems that do enforce donative promises without any 
reported damage to the world of gift. 219 In any case, even 
assuming that such harm is possible, our analysis of the 
affective dynamics can offer some comfort. There is no doubt 
that an enforcement rule may lead to litigation, and litigation 
can trigger negative emotions that conflict with the positive 
cycle of empathy and gratitude. Yet it is important to note that 
the interruption of affective harmony does not originate in the 
chosen rule of law. Whenever a promise is not kept, negative 
emotions are likely to arise, either for the promisee (if the 
promise is not enforced) or for the promisor (if it is enforced). 
Once self-interests override empathic altruism and take over, 
gratitude and trust turn into disappointment and frustration, 
while harmony is severely interrupted. In other words, much 
of the damage is done regardless of the availability of legal 
response. In contrast, life in the shadow of the law, where legal 
217 A similar argument has been used for decades to justify unenforceability of 
economic promises that were made in the intimate sphere where restrictions of 
enforceability were explained as a way "to mark the dignity and specialness of intimate 
relations." See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARv. 
L. REV. 491, 493 (2005). For a critique of Hasday's analysis from a feminist 
perspective, see Hila Keren, Can Separate Be Equal? Intimate Economic Exchange and 
the Cost of Being Special, 119 HARv. L. REV. F. 19 (2005). 
Since Eisenberg's definition of donative promises locates them as part of the 
intimate sphere, the connection between the debates is more than accidental. In 
both cases it is hard to accept that the denial of law from the allegedly non-legal 
spheres (the domestic arena and the world of gifts, respectively) stems from a 
belief in their superiority. 
218 Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 847. 
219 JOHN P. DAWSON, GIFrS AND PROMISES: CONTINENTAL AND AMERICAN LAw 
COMPARED (1980). 
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remedies are available, may turn out to be more respectful to 
the original feelings and may deter people from changing their 
mind after promising while surrendering to their more-selfish 
inner voices. 
Professor Eisenberg further argues that, under an 
enforceability rule, the recipient won't be able to know whether 
the promise was kept for the right reasons (the original care for 
the other) or for the wrong reasons (the fear of legal sanction) 
and that such ambiguity would destroy the spirit of the gift. 220 
However, as we have seen, the affective response of the 
promisee, the feeling of gratitude, emerges in response to the 
original expression of empathy by the promisor. At this early 
phase the law is remote and has no bearing on the situation 
unless it is invoked by the parties. The positive intentions of 
the promisor in the moments of promising then cannot be 
obscured by the possibility of enforcement and cannot deprive 
the promise of its generous character. Quite to the contrary: a 
promise that is accompanied by a special intentional effort to 
make it legally binding may communicate more care and 
empathy and more commitment to the giving than a promise 
that is made carelessly or in a fashion that avoids the law. 
Moreover, market atmosphere is not innately threatening. 
Sometimes it is the denial of legal or market tools that can be 
weakening, while their availability may become empowering 
and liberating.221 Blurring the lines between markets and gifts 
can help rather than harm the world of gifts by emphasizing 
rather than obscuring the importance and the distinct affective 
value of the gift. Consider, for example, the flourishing market 
in gift cards. Many people invest time and energy in 
exchanging money for a colorful plastic card that has the same 
or similar value. What can explain this behavior is a need to 
distinguish the gift-ness of the thing that is going to be 
transferred and differentiate it from a payment of money. 
Although not always the most personal or creative gifts,222 gift 
220 Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 847. 
221 Compare to the feminist concerns with regard to the absence of law from the 
domestic sphere. See, e.g., Hasday, supra note 217, at 517 (arguing that 
unenforceability of intimate agreements "appear[s) to have systematically adverse 
distributional consequences for women and poorer people, maintaining and increasing 
distributive inequality."). 
222 Donative promises of the kind discussed here should not be compared to 
creative gifts such as hand-made unique pieces of jewelry. For the most part the 
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cards at least offer people a way of marking the nature of their 
giving by relying on the market. The market then does not 
ruin the spirit of the gift, as suggested by Eisenberg, but rather 
is assisting people in calling attention to the fact that what 
they are giving is a thing that carries something in addition to 
its monetary value. 
Even if there is no ground for actual contamination, can it 
be that the risk still exists at a more symbolic level? Can it be 
that merely thinking about law and emotions in tandem can 
impoverish the world of gift by having a weakening impact over 
the affects that structure this world? Not according to law-and-
the-emotions scholarship. As argued in previous work, law can 
engage the emotions in quite a few distinctive ways, either 
purposely or inadvertently,223 and its interaction with emotions 
is so complex that it cannot be assumed that applying law will 
always harm the emotions. The law can, for example, express 
emotions, channel them, and even foster and cultivate them.224 
It is, therefore, far too simplistic to assume that applying law 
to an affect-laden context will necessarily have a negative 
effect. 
Furthermore, a negative impact of law may be a product of 
particular legal norms, for example when legal rules isolate 
prisoners and thereby harm their sense of hope. However, the 
view that the law will have such a negative impact just because 
of its supposed inherently rational nature seems to be unsound. 
Similarly, the argument that the prospect of future 
enforcement can color or obscure emotions that arise in the 
present is equally doubtful. Consider, for example, the fact 
that the law is available to enforce prenuptial agreements and 
to preside over the process of divorce, yet that legal presence 
does not impoverish people's love life during the marriage. 
Law is also capable of intervention in cases of adoption and 
promises discussed here are to transfer money or tangible assets that have relatively 
clear monetary value. In general, money gifts are viewed by many as sending out a 
weaker message of care than a purchased gift, and even more so if compared to hand-
made gifts. See David Cheal, "Showing Them You Love Them"; Gift Giving and the 
Dialectic of Intimacy, in THE GIFT: .AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE 95 (Aafke E. 
Komter ed., 1996). In this sense, donative promises can be seen as occupying a hybrid 
space with elements of gift and of market to begin with. 
223 Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, wno~ Afraid of Law and the Emotions, 94 
Minn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010). 
224 Id. (suggesting "A Framework for Analyzing Law~ Relations to the 
Emotions"). 
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custody, yet this does not corrode the richness of emotions that 
are associated with parenthood. Correspondingly, there is no 
apparent reason to believe that applying law to donative 
promises will cause, in and of itself, a weakening of the 
empathy, care, love, and gratitude that are associated with the 
giving and receiving of gifts. Additionally, even if some price 
has to be paid in this regard and there is some affective cost 
attached to legal intervention, it does not follow that promises 
of gifts should not be enforced. Notably, there is no evidence 
that family relations or friendships are stronger in the United 
States than in countries that enforce promises of gifts. 
E. A SUGGESTED REFORM: "CONSCIOUS ENFORCEMENT" 
After considering the affective benefits and detriments 
that playa role in the donative-promises arena, it is no longer 
clear what may justify a sweeping unenforceability rule. The 
doubt and the need for change are especially significant when 
the promisor's intention to make a legally binding promise is 
evident, such as when that intention is expressed in explicit 
words or by an effort to artificially satisfy the conventional 
consideration requirement. However, American contract law 
"close[s] the door on enforcement entirely, whether the parties 
intended legal liability or not.,,225 Section 21 of the Second 
Restatement of Contracts generalizes the rule that applies to 
all promises - bargained-for as well as donative - and clarifies: 
"Neither real nor apparent intention that a promise be legally 
binding is essential to the formation of a contract.,,226 For the 
most part this section works to release commercial promisors 
from the extra burden of documenting intent and therefore it 
makes it easier for parties to exercise their freedom to 
contract.227 And yet, when applied to donative promises the 
section has the opposite effect: it means that parties who want 
to create a legally binding donative promise cannot - under the 
current regime - enjoy the freedom to do so and cannot create 
an affectively based contract. One way to understand the 
225 Gregory Klass, Intent To Contract, 95 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1494 (2009) (emphasis 
added). 
226 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1981). 
227 One exception within the market world is the requirement that the 
enforcement of preliminary agreements depends on the parties' intention to be legally 
bound. See Klass, supra note 225, at 1494. 
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notion that the intent of the parties is irrelevant in a 
contractual system that is supposed to be grounded on their 
will is to recognize that, as far as the commercial sphere is 
concerned, the existence of intent is inferred from the existence 
of consideration. A promise given for consideration enjoys a 
presumption that it is intended to be legally binding. This is a 
strong and unmitigated presumption and thus no further 
evidence is needed or, if offered, can change the result of 
enforceability. A similarly total presumption seems to apply to 
a donative promise, where the supposed lack of consideration is 
taken as an absence of an intention to create a legally binding 
promise. Here, too, no additional evidence is required in order 
to show the lack of intention, nor does it matter if the promisee 
can offer evidence that such intention did exist. 
It is at this point that the affective analysis offered here 
can have normative significance, as it undermines the 
conclusion that the lack of conventional consideration 
necessarily means that intention is absent. As we have seen 
throughout the discussion, people have serious reasons to 
promise gifts that carry legal consequences, for example in 
order to allow the persons they want to benefit to fully rely on 
their promises and/or to allay concerns that they will not be 
alive long enough to perform the promises and that their heirs 
will try to breach. Accordingly, a rule could have been adopted 
that donative promises will be enforced in the same manner 
that bargained-for promises are being enforced, i.e., 
irrespective of intention. However, respecting the emotions of 
empathy and gratitude seems to require more sensitivity, not 
in order to totally deny the enforceability of donative promises, 
but in order to verify that their enforcement is truly what the 
parties wished for and relied on. 
To encompass the importance of the freedom to have a 
contract in the affective domain, on the one hand, and the 
distinctive character of donative promises and the "world of 
gift," on the other hand, it is proposed to design a special rule 
of enforcement. The suggested rule would require courts to be 
more conscious and sensible about the decision to enforce 
donative promises and it therefore it can be referred to as a 
rule of "conscious enforcement." It would refrain from 
automatically denying the enforcement of donative promises 
but, at the same time, would not apply the opposite rule of 
unlimited enforcement. Instead, it would seek an intermediate 
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norm that is set somewhere on the spectrum between the high 
level of enforcement granted to market promises and the non-
enforcement currently applied to donative promises. 
To accomplish such a goal we can adopt any of several 
variations of conscious enforcement, which differ by their 
distance from the now-existing unenforceability rule. 
Generally speaking, it is possible to tailor a rule of contingent 
enforceability under which donative promises will be enforced 
provided that they were intended to be legally binding. Such 
special and limited enforceability can be phrased in several 
ways to reflect different degrees of legal support. It is viable, 
for example, to design a relatively conservative rule that 
deviates only slightly from the current unenforceability regime, 
by setting unenforceability as the default norm unless a clear 
intention of the promisor to make a legally binding promise can 
be shown. Such variation may be shaped in an extremely 
restrictive way, such as by adding a requirement that the legal 
intention be explicitly stated in writing, or in a more flexible 
form where counter-intention can be shown in more than one 
way. Another alternative is to further highlight the potential 
legal meaning of a donative promise by adopting a rule that 
renders it enforceable if it· contains an expression of the 
promisor's intent to make it legally binding. 228 One major 
difference between the alternatives is symbolic: while the first 
variation marks donative promises as generally unenforceable, 
the second underscores their potential to become enforceable. 
Choosing between the two main models of conscious 
228 Some formal requirements may be added here, such as the need for a written 
or even signed statement of the promisor. One possible model can be found in 
Pennsylvania, where a written gratuitous promise is enforceable if it "contains an 
additional express statement, in any form of language, that the signer intends to be 
legally bound." 33 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6 (1997). I thank Professor Gregory Klass for this 
reference. The background of the Pennsylvania rule adds a practical dimension to the 
theoretical uneasiness that accompanies the dichotomy of bargained-for/gratuitous 
promises. See James D. Gordon III, Consideration and the Commercial-Gift 
Dichotomy, 44 V AND. L. REV. 283, 311-12 (1991) (describing the history of the act as 
follows: "in 1925 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
proposed the Model Written Obligations Act. The Act provides that a signed written 
promise shall not be unenforceable for lack of consideration if the writing contains 'an 
additional express statement, in any form of language, that the signer intends to be 
legally bound.' Only Pennsylvania and Utah adopted it, however, and Utah later 
repealed it. Other states were reluctant to adopt the Act because such a clause could 
be inserted into the body of an unread printed form, and therefore the express 
statement of an intention to be bound did not ensure that the intention really existed. 
At the same time, the form could leave the other party's performance optional.") 
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enforceability and deciding about the particulars of their 
internal design does not seem necessary at the moment, 
although the analysis of the social value of empathy and 
gratitude does suggest that the latter model, which is a pro-
enforcement rule, might fit better with public-policy goals such 
as fostering positive emotions.229 Nonetheless, even a more-
moderate reform could contribute immensely to the freedom to 
contract, namely the freedom to make legally binding donative 
promises, and can more appropriately indicate the individual 
and social value of affectively motivated promises. 
Finally, conscious enforcement of donative promises will 
not only benefit the world of gift, it can also enrich the world of 
contracts and the law. If donative promises are taken to be 
honest expressions of empathy and altruism, rather than 
selfish bargains in disguise, then the legal support of such 
promises by means of contractual enforcement may develop 
new capacity within contract law. By offering enforceability to 
donative promises, the law may be seen as playing a new role: 
helping the promisor to express and communicate her feelings 
about the promisee and their relationship. It would also 
support and foster the existence of empathy and gratitude in 
society. In this respect it is imperative to remember the 
symbolic power of law. For most people who live in the shadow 
of the law, the ability to enforce a promise signifies the 
investment of social resources in the promise and, by extension, 
its social importance.23o 
229 The concrete design of a conscious enforceability rule can benefit immensely 
from taking into account two separate questions that are defined by Professor Klass. 
The first is whether to adopt an enforcement or nonenforcement interpretive default. 
The second relates to the way to prove non-default intentions (opting out) where the 
main alternatives are burdening the party who wants to opt out to express her 
intention in a certain way or to rely on a court's determination of the promisor's 
intention (based on the available evidence). For an illuminating discussion of those 
questions, see Klass, supra note 225, at 1494. 
230 Seeing law as actively facilitating these affective dimensions of human 
interaction is a novel idea that has recently been framed and endorsed by law-and-the-
emotions scholars. It descriptively acknowledges that law participates in affective 
processes, and it normatively supports this possible contribution. It also views the 
integration of law and the emotions with caution - being attentive to the possibility of 
concrete undesirable outcomes. To take another example connected to the intimate 
sphere, one can think about the role of contract law in facilitating cohabitation 
agreements between same-sex partners. On the one hand, the law of most states 
prevents such partners from using marriage as a way of expressing feelings of long-
term love, mutual commitment and trust. On the other hand, by utili2ing contract law, 
with all its rituals and formalities, the law can help the same parties to convey their 
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CONCLUSION 
The law can relate to people's emotions in many sensible 
and subtle ways - it does not have to be crude. Therefore, the 
question of donative promises that lack a conventional sort of 
consideration should not be limited to a Hamlet-style query: to 
enforce or not to enforce. Instead, we should ask about the 
appropriate legal response to the similarities and differences 
between donative promises and bargained-for promises. 
This Article demonstrated that those similarities and 
differences do not support the existing reflexive denial of 
enforcement, but rather justify some form of legal recognition. 
It concluded with a concrete suggestion to move from total 
refusal to enforce donative promises to a cautious willingness 
to enforce them "consciously" in cases of existing intention to 
create legally binding promises. Yet, the Article's sustained 
examination of empathy and gratitude may prompt questions 
that reach beyond the enforceability debate. For example, 
understandings of gratitude may make us consider adding a 
legal mechanism that ensures that the potential promisee is 
willing to accept the emotional consequences (or costs) of a 
donative promise. Similarly, it may lead us to allow the 
promisor to revoke his promise in circumstances that reflect a 
severe lack of gratitude.231 In other words, the nuanced work of 
how to enforce donative promises in a way that responds to 
their special affective dimensions is a challenge that awaits the 
attention of future law-and-the-emotions scholars. 
emotions - toward each other and toward the larger world. Law, as seen from this new 
perspective, becomes capable of closing the gaps between traditionally segregated 
worlds. Importantly, it does that not by imposing itself or limiting people's freedom (as 
law does when it bans marriage) but rather by offering them the benefit of its potential 
effect on the emotions. 
231 Such as in cases of a cruel treatment ofthe donor. 
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